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I. INTRODUCTION 
In 1960, a simpler time when the California Law Review published 
articles by practitioners, attorney Merle Bergman sounded a warning about a 
pernicious trend: 
Some loose language has come out of the Second Circuit since 1949 
which has led some attorneys, and even some courts, to believe that the law 
has somehow done an about-face and that it now recognizes the validity of 
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contractual clauses limiting the forum in which a cause of action may be 
brought, whereas it previously denied validity to such clauses.1 
Loose language indeed. Mr. Bergman’s concern was about forum clauses 
and it no doubt became alarm in 1972 with the Supreme Court’s decision in 
the Bremen case.2 His view of history was mistaken—there was never a 
categorical rejection of forum clauses—but his concern was correct about the 
extreme rule that was coming.  
A forum clause (also called a forum selection agreement or choice-of-
forum clause) is a contractual provision for dispute resolution, often paired 
with a clause naming the applicable law. Forum clauses have five possible 
components that may occur in any combination: 
(1) location, which maybe be a specific site or court, or 
merely designate any court in the identified state or country; 
(2) scope, which usually includes claims arising on the 
contract containing the clause but may entail other claims; 
(3) mode of dispute resolution such as arbitration or 
litigation; 
(4) if litigation, the type of court such as state or federal; and 
(5) the clause’s binding nature (permissive or mandatory).  
The parties to a permissive clause consent to jurisdiction in the named forum 
but remain free to file elsewhere. A mandatory or exclusive clause limits 
litigation to the named forum.3 
Forum clauses promote efficiency and predictability but can also be used 
in nefarious ways to give a venue advantage or even thwart access to a 
forum.4 Because contracting parties sometimes don’t see the disadvantage 
 
 1 G. Merle Bergman, Contractual Restrictions on the Forum, 48 CAL. L. REV. 438, 438 (1960) 
[hereinafter Contractual Restrictions]. 
 2 The Bremen v. Zapata Off-shore Co., 407 U.S. 1, 2 (1972). 
 3 E.g., id. at 3; Atl. Marine Constr. Co. v. U.S. Dist. Court for W. Dist. of Tex., 571 U.S. 49, 
52–53 (2013). 
 4 Forum clauses can also accomplish specific judge shopping by designating a venue (state or 
federal) having only one judge, although plaintiffs can do the same forum shopping in choosing 
where to file. See 1 JAMES R. PRATT, III & BRUCE J. MCKEE, LITIGATING TORT CASES § 3:10 
(2018). 
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until the dispute arises, and because the forum clause is bargains away 
something that is more of a public function than a private contract right, 
parties who perceive a disadvantage will often violate the clause. This 
happens in two scenarios. The first is where plaintiff files in the contractual 
forum and defendant objects to personal jurisdiction there. The second is 
where plaintiff files in another forum (in derogation of the clause), and 
defendant seeks to enforce the clause and have the case moved (by transfer 
or dismissal) to the contractual forum. In the first scenario, the only question 
is whether the forum clause operates as consent or the defendant is otherwise 
amenable to suit there. Although those cases can be decided either way, there 
is not a lot of controversy about them. The controversy lies in the second 
scenario with the derogating plaintiff, in which the initial forum must decide 
whether to honor the clause and decline jurisdiction. 
How this question is decided may depend on the relationship between the 
derogating forum and the contractually-chosen one. There are five possible 
relationships: intra-jurisdictional (the chosen and derogating forums are in 
the same state or within the United States federal system);5 interstate (two 
states in the United States);6 state-federal;7 state-foreign;8 and federal-
 
 5 E.g., Atlantic, 571 U.S. at 52–53. 
 6 E.g., Prof’l Ins. Corp. v. Sutherland, 700 So.2d 347, 349 (Ala. 1997) (adopted the Bremen 
test for forum clause issues involving a sister state). 
 7 E.g., Int’l Software Sys., Inc. v. Amplicon, Inc., 77 F.3d 112, 113 (5th Cir. 1996) (applying 
Bremen to dismiss a case in deference to a forum clause pointing to California state courts); In re 
Diaz Contracting, Inc., 817 F.2d 1047, 1050 (3rd Cir. 1987) (applying state law which incorporated 
Bremen standards to enforce a forum clause). For cases filed in state courts, facing a forum clause 
pointing exclusively to federal court, the remedy is removal rather than a motion to dismiss. Once 
removed, it may be transferred under 28 U.S.C. § 1404. Atlantic, 571 U.S. at 52. 
 8 E.g., Deep Water Slender Wells, Ltd. v. Shell Int’l Exploration & Prod., Inc., 234 S.W.3d 
679, 683 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2007, no pet.) (enforced clause designating the 
Netherlands). 
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foreign, many of which are further complicated by the claim’s subject matter 
such as admiralty;9 federal question;10 or diversity of citizenship.11 
The legal analysis varies among jurisdictions but in general there are two 
questions: Is the forum clause valid, and if so, should it be enforced?12 The 
answers don’t come easily. The varied components of forum clauses combine 
with the five possible settings and two lawsuit-filing categories (prorogating 
and derogating) to create permutations too complex to catalogue here. The 
simplest example is a prorogating permissive clause, where plaintiff filed in 
the chosen court, there’s no other court to consider, and the only question is 
defendant’s consent to jurisdiction. A more difficult example is a derogating 
mandatory clause where plaintiff filed in a different court and defendant 
responds both by invoking the forum clause in the initial jurisdiction and 
filing its own parallel action in the contractually-chosen jurisdiction. 
My purpose is not to describe those permutations but to focus on the 
second example with a recent case illustrating the extreme forum-clause 
presumption now driving the analysis in federal courts. In 1972, the Court 
has increasingly raised the bar on contracting parties wishing to challenge 
forum clauses. The most recent case, Atlantic Marine, underscores the 
enforcement mandate and encourages a summary analysis designed to find a 
way to enforce clauses that should be rejected, or at least questioned more 
thoroughly than the Supreme Court’s language directs.13 In effect, the 
Atlantic Marine presumption instructs courts to find a way to enforce the 
clause.14 The presumption’s severity is not just in its wording, but in its 
application, which is suggested by the Court’s instructions for applying the 
presumption.15 “When the parties have agreed to a valid forum-selection 
clause, a district court should ordinarily transfer the case to the forum 
 
 9 E.g., The Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1, 2 (1972); Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc. 
v. Shute, 499 U.S. 585, 588 (1991). 
 10 E.g., Richards v. Lloyd’s of London, 135 F.3d 1289, 1292 (9th Cir. 1998) (dismissed the 
securities case in deference to a forum clause designating “the courts of England”). 
 11 E.g., Manetti-Farrow, Inc. v. Gucci Am., Inc., 858 F.2d 509, 511 (9th Cir. 1988); Afram 
Carriers v. Moeykens, 145 F.3d 298, 301 (5th Cir. 1998). 
 12 See Bremen, 407 U.S. at 1913, 1916. 
 13 Atl. Marine Constr. Co. v. U.S. Dist. Court for W. Dist. of Tex., 571 U.S. 49, 63 (2013). 
 14 Id. 
 15 Id. 
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specified in that clause. Only under extraordinary circumstances, unrelated 
to the convenience of the parties, should a § 1404(a) motion be denied.”16 
This may read like a routine contract rule but it produces strained examples 
of enforcement. 
According to the original explanation in Bremen, the presumption is 
drawn from the Supreme Court’s rejection of an ill-conceived practice in 
English and American law.17 The Bremen Court’s explanation of that 
practice, consistent with that of many lower courts and scholars, was that 
forum clauses suffered from near-total rejection which should be replaced by 
a reasoned acceptance.18 That historical assessment was wrong. As a number 
of scholars (but few courts) have pointed out, this historical view was a 
popular myth.19 Closer studies of history discredit this and provide nuances 
that tell a different story—forum clauses have been around for hundreds of 
years with varying acceptance, even though the majority of reported 
American cases rejected them.20 The law has gone from that uneven 
acceptance to Atlantic Marine’s radical presumption favoring enforcement. 
This article will first dispel the historical account and demonstrate an 
enforcement history that was reasoned and fairly consistent in England, but 
erratic in the United States, yielding to an ever-increasing contract-autonomy 
view after Bremen. The history concludes with concerns about what is now 
the Bremen/Atlantic Marine presumption (referred to under either case name 
depending on the context and time frame), including its encouragement of 
summary analysis and enforcement. To illustrate this extreme, the last section 
focuses on a Fifth Circuit decision that, with its cursory analysis and extreme 
favoring of enforcement, leaves significant questions unanswered—a result 
the law should not support but that Bremen and its progeny may promote. 
II.  FORUM CLAUSE HISTORY IN THE ANGLO-AMERICAN SYSTEM 
While it is possible to discuss the Supreme Court presumption from 
Bremen and Atlantic Marine in isolation, a historical view gives insight to 
 
 16 Id. 
 17 Bremen, 407 U.S. at 9. 
 18 Id. at 10. 
 19 See infra Part II.B.1. 
 20 See infra Part II.B.2. 
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the often-misstated history from which the extreme presumption derives. 
That history necessarily includes litigation and arbitration clauses because of 
the tendency to intertwine the precedents. Although some English cases 
distinguished between arbitration and foreign-court clauses, the Common 
Law Procedure Act contained a provision providing for arbitration clauses 
which was used to allow non-arbitration forum clauses designating another 
forum.21 United States case law mixed categories further, not only blending 
arbitration precedents with foreign-court clauses,22 but going so far as to use 
English precedent in a case striking down a Wisconsin statute barring 
removal to federal court and fixing litigation in state court.23 
A.  English Predicates 
1.  Arbitration Clauses and the Doctrines of Revocability and 
Ouster 
From the accounts available now, arbitration clauses led the development 
of forum clause jurisprudence. Arbitration clauses were in common use by 
the early Seventeenth Century, and challenges to those clauses brought about 
the concept of revocability, and then the ouster doctrine. Revocability was 
the idea that a contracting party could revoke an arbitration agreement, and 
the related ouster doctrine was that forum clauses (either for arbitration or a 
foreign court) could not oust an English court’s jurisdiction.  
The revocability doctrine came from vague dictum in a 1609 Lord Coke 
opinion in Vynior’s Case.24 Robert Vynior and William Wilde had an 
agreement with an arbitration clause secured by a bond for twenty pounds.25 
 
 21 See Law v. Garrett, (1878) 8 Ch. D. 26 (C.A.) at 37 (clause calling for litigation in Russia 
upheld under the Common Law Procedure Act’s arbitration provision). 
 22 See Kelvin Eng’g Co. v. Blanco, 210 N.Y.S. 10, 13 (1925) (forum clause pointing to litigation 
in Santiago, Chile approved under New York arbitration law). 
 23 See Home Ins. Co. v. Morse, 87 U.S. 445, 451 (1874), discussed infra notes 136–39 and 
accompanying text. 
 24 Vynior’s Case, (1609) 77 Eng. Rep. 597, 598–99 (K.B.), discussed in Paul D. Carrington & 
Paul Y. Castle, The Revocability of Contract Provisions Controlling Resolution of Future Disputes 
Between the Parties, 67 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 207, 209 (2004) [hereinafter Carrington & 
Castle]. 
 25 Carrington & Castle, supra note 24, at 208. 
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When a dispute arose and Wilde refused to submit to arbitration, Vynior sued 
to collect on the bond.26 The court ruled in Vynior’s favor, enforcing his 
collection on the bond, but Lord Coke added the unnecessary explanation that 
although Wilde was obligated by bond to heed the arbitration agreement, “yet 
he might countermand it, for one cannot by his act make such authority, 
power or warrant not countermandable which is by the law or of its own 
nature countermandable.”27 That is, Wilde retained the power to revoke his 
arbitration agreement but would have to forfeit the bond.28 
Lord Coke gave no further reason for the inherent right to revoke an 
arbitration clause and did not mention the later-evolving theory of 
jurisdictional ouster.29 That came almost a century and a half later with Kill 
v. Hollister involving an insurance contract with an arbitration clause.30 
When the insured filed a lawsuit in defiance of the clause, defendant insurer 
pleaded the arbitration clause as a defense and plaintiff responded that there 
had been no submission to arbitration, thus rendering the clause void. The 
court held for plaintiff, observing that if the parties had submitted the case to 
arbitration, that submission would be honored, but absent such submission, 
the arbitration clause “cannot oust this Court.”31 The entire opinion was three 
sentences which gave no reason for its holding but the bare statement was 
sufficient to create a doctrine that pre-dispute agreements designating a 
forum did not defeat a contracting party’s filing suit in a different forum.32 
 
 26 Carrington & Castle, supra note 24, at 208. 
 27 Id. at 208–09. 
 28 See Justice Story’s description in Tobey v. County of Bristol, 23 F. Cas. 1313, 1321 (D. Mass. 
1845) (No. 14,065). See also Kulukundis Shipping Co. v. Amtorg Trading Corp., 126 F.2d 978, 982 
(2d Cir. 1942); Carrington & Castle, supra note 24, at 209. 
 29 Carrington and Castle explain that common law judges of that time often gave no reasons for 
their opinions. See Carrington & Castle, supra note 24, at 210. They speculated that the revocability 
doctrine flowed naturally as a necessary curb on the otherwise unlimited power of arbitrators—the 
contracting party did not have to submit to their unlimited power but could revoke it, although 
revocation would cause bond forfeiture. Id. at 210. 
 30 (1746) 95 Eng. Rep. 532, 532 (K.B.). 
 31 Id. 
 32 Kill v. Hollister, the progenitor of ouster cases, reads in its entirety: 
This is an action upon a policy of insurance, wherein a clause was inserted, that in case 
of any loss or dispute about the policy it should be referred to arbitration; and the plaintiff 
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In 1799, a claim by a ship charterer seeking to bypass an arbitration clause 
provided a firmer statement:  
[I]t is not necessary now to say how this point ought to be 
determined if it were res integra, it having been decided 
again and again that an agreement to refer all matters is 
difference to arbitration is not sufficient to oust the Court of 
Law or Equity of their jurisdiction.33 
Based on speculative dictum in an 1856 case,34 commentators have reported 
that courts were motivated by the need to guard their territory from non-
judicial incursions.35 That view, however, is historically unsupportable, as 
noted by several later accounts. One of the best summaries of corrected 
history is Judge Wisdom’s dissent in the Fifth Circuit Bremen opinion: 
[U]ntil the Statute of Fines and Penalties, 8 & 9 Wm. III 
(1687), made the remedy impractical, courts consistently 
enforced arbitration agreements through the vehicle of penal 
bonds. With this remedy gone, pressure mounted to make 
arbitration agreements irrevocable. The courts resisted not 
on account of the fees involved, but because “arbitration 
proceedings were not regulated and the parties’ only 
effective protection against an unfair or insufficient hearing 
 
avers in his declaration that there has been no reference. Upon the trial at Guildhall the 
point was reserved for the consideration of the Court, whether this action well laid before 
a reference had been? And by the whole Court-if there had been a reference depending, 
or made and determined, it might have been at Bar, but the agreement of the parties 
cannot oust this Court; and as no reference has been, nor any is depending, the action is 
well brought, and the plaintiff must have judgment. 
Id. 
 33 Thompson v. Charnock, (1799) 101 Eng. Rep. 1310, 1310, 8 Term Rep. 139. 
 34 In Scott v. Avery, (1856) 10 Eng. Rep. 1121, 1138 (H.L.), Lord Campbell wrote that the 
ouster doctrine “ . . . probably originated in the contests of the different courts in ancient times for 
extent of jurisdiction, all of them being opposed to anything that would altogether deprive every 
one of them of jurisdiction.” 
 35 See, e.g., Earl S. Wolaver, Historical Background of Commercial Arbitration, 83 U. PA. L. 
REV. 132, 143 (1934) [hereinafter Wolaver]. See infra notes 68-72 and accompanying text for a 
further discussion of turf protection. 
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by the arbitrators was in revoking the submission before the 
award was given.” Not until the nineteenth century was the 
revocability of arbitration agreements simply premised on 
the courts’ opposition to ‘ouster’ from their jurisdiction. And 
then legislative action both in England and in the United 
States encouraged the courts to take a more benevolent view 
of such agreements.36 
In any event, the ouster doctrine survived with exceptions and would later 
take on even stronger meaning in the United States.37 
During this period, at least two English cases enforced arbitration clauses 
and led commentators to argue that the English courts were never bound up 
in the anti-arbitration doctrines of revocability and ouster.38 The pro-
arbitration view solidified with Scott v. Avery in 1856 when the House of 
Lords reversed a lower court and held an arbitration clause enforceable where 
it was merely a condition precedent to filing a court action.39 The court 
reasoned that even though “[t]here is no doubt of the general principle that 
parties cannot by contract oust the ordinary courts of their jurisdiction . . . .” 
that courts nonetheless lack jurisdiction until the condition precedent is 
performed, that is, no action accrues until then, and parties have a right to 
craft the elements of a breach.40 This opinion created a bifurcated rule that if 
the contract created a condition precedent to filing suit, then it was valid, but 
 
 36 Zapata Off-Shore Co. v. M/S Bremen, 428 F.2d 888, 899 (5th Cir. 1970) (citations and 
footnotes omitted). The court of appeals decision is referred to herein as Zapata and the Supreme 
Court’s opinion is Bremen. 
 37 See generally infra Section II.B. 
 38 See Halfhide v. Fenning, (1788) 29 Eng. Rep. 187, 188 (Ch.); Wellington v. Mackintosh, 
(1743) 26 Eng. Rep. 741, 741 (Ch.), discussed in Wolaver, supra note 35, at 140; Carrington & 
Castle, supra note 24, at 211. 
 39 Scott, 10 Eng. Rep. at 1121. 
 40 Id. at 1135. 
 
7 GEORGE (DO NOT DELETE) 6/18/2019  11:19 AM 
2019] FORUM CLAUSES AT THE MARGIN 277 
   
 
if it merely bound the parties to arbitrate, it was unenforceable.41 The 
enforceable arbitration clause became known as a “Scott v. Avery clause.”42 
Two years before Scott v. Avery, Parliament enacted the Common Law 
Procedure Act of 185443 which enabled parties to make arbitration agreement 
irrevocable by applying to a court to make it a “rule of court.” This applied 
to all arbitration agreements except those that disallowed it; that is, it applied 
to agreements that provided for it and those that were silent on application 
for entry as a rule of court.44 The Scott v. Avery decision two years later did 
not rely on the Act in upholding an arbitration clause, probably because the 
lower court record had been made before 1854. In any event, Scott retained 
its vitality as a drafting tool because its technique—making submission to 
arbitration a condition precedent for a breach claim—applied in both law and 
equity courts, while the Common Law Procedure Act regulated only common 
law courts.45 In assessing this legislative protection for arbitration, it is 
important to note that the Act did not disturb judicial jurisdiction and in fact 
preserved the power of judicial review of arbitration decision,46 and was 
merely seen as authorizing judicial discretion to stay litigation to allow the 
 
 41 See Wolaver, supra note 35, at 143. Scott did not refute the ouster theory and in fact cited 
Kill v. Hollister for the proposition. See Scott, 10 Eng. Rep. at 1124. Instead, Scott observed that an 
arbitration clause drafted as a condition precedent to breach became part of the contract and thus 
enforceable by the court. Scott, 10 Eng. Rep. at 1121, passim. 
 42 Andrew Tweeddale & Keren Tweeddale, Scott v Avery Clauses: O’er Judges’ Fingers, Who 
Straight Dream on Fees, 77 Arbitration 423, 423 (2011). Another commentator disputes this history, 
noting: 
The doctrine of condition precedent is earlier than Scott v. Avery and the case is only a 
reaffirmance of what was already the law. At best Scott v. Avery represents one of the 
various views of the English law of arbitration and is scarcely entitled to the exalted place 
it holds. 
Wolaver, supra note 35, at 143. 
 43 Common Law Procedure Act, 1854, 17 & 18 Vict., c. 125 (Eng.) [hereinafter “Common Law 
Procedure Act”]. 
 44 Common Law Procedure Act, at § 27. See also Carrington & Castle, supra note 24, at 213–
14. 
 45 Common Law Procedure Act. 
 46 See Carrington & Castle, supra note 24, at 214. 
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arbitration to proceed.47 Even though that provision of the Act was limited to 
arbitration clauses, it took on an additional role of helping enforce forum 
clauses designating foreign courts for litigation, as explained below. 
2.  Foreign-Court Clauses in England 
In a pre-Bremen article disputing the notion that foreign litigation clauses 
were not accepted in England, two commentators observed that “It has ‘long 
been settled’ that parties may agree to designate a forum of their choice, and 
the decisions date back to 1796.”48 Although arbitration and foreign court 
clauses evolved somewhat distinctly, arbitration precedents were used to 
justify foreign court clauses. 
English common law recognized a foreign court clause in 1796 with 
Gienar v. Meyer, and perhaps a key reason was that no English residents were 
involved—the two parties were a Dutch sailor who sued his Dutch shipmaster 
for unpaid wages.49 The pertinent agreement was the ship’s articles, which 
designated the controlling law as the maritime code of Rotterdam and limited 
adjudication to Dutch courts.50 The English court stayed the action in favor 
of litigation in Holland, noting that the contracting parties were foreigners 
and the contract was valid under Dutch law.51 In 1811, an English court again 
enforced a foreign-forum clause,52 and neither case provided a precedent or 
source for its power to stay the locally-filed suit.53 
The Gienar precedent gave way to the use of the 1854 Common Law 
Procedure Act to approve fixed-site litigation clauses, as demonstrated in 
 
 47 See Zapata Off-Shore Co. v. M/S Bremen, 428 F.2d 888, n.9 (5th Cir. 1970) (Wisdom, J., 
dissenting). 
 48 Zelman Cowen & Derek Mendes da Costa, The Contractual Forum: Situation in England 
and the British Commonwealth, from The Validity of Forum Selecting Clauses: Proceedings of the 
1964 Annual Meeting of the American Foreign Law Association, 13 AM. J. COMP. L. 157, 180 
(1964) [hereinafter Cowen & da Costa] (quoting Westcott v. Alsco Prods. of Canada Ltd., 26 D.L.R. 
2d 281 (Newf. 1960), and referring to Gienar v. Meyer, (1796) 126 Eng. Rep. 728 (C.P.)). 
 49 (1796) 126 Eng. Rep. 728, 728 (C.P.). 
 50 Cowen & da Costa, supra note 48, at 182. 
 51 Id. 
 52 Johnson v. Machielsne, (1811) 170 Eng. Rep. 1300, 1300 (N.P.)., Cowen & da Costa, supra 
note 48, at 182. 
 53 See Cowen & da Costa, supra note 48, at 182. 
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Law v. Garrett.54 In this case, there was an agreement between two English 
residents regarding a Russian partnership with an office in St Petersburg.55 
Their agreement had a forum clause requiring that disputes be submitted to a 
commercial court in St. Petersburg.56 One of the partners sued for partnership 
dissolution in a London court, and the defendant raised the forum clause. The 
court ruled in the defendant’s favor and granted a stay, citing the Common 
Law Procedure Act and characterizing the forum clause as one for arbitration, 
even though the clause did not mention arbitration and instead referred to a 
Russian court.57 Noting the ouster argument, the court held that the Act had 
not ousted the court’s jurisdiction but merely granted the court authority to 
stay the proceeding.58 In so ruling, the court agreed with Willesford v. Watson 
that where “parties choose to determine for themselves that they will have a 
forum of their own selection instead of resorting to the ordinary Courts, a 
prima facie duty is cast upon the Courts to act upon such arrangement.”59 
English courts thus enforced clauses designating foreign-court litigation 
under both common law and statutory authority. Based on these foundational 
cases, courts applied a discretionary standard that led both to enforcement60 
and rejection61 of forum clauses.62 
 
 54 [1878] 8 Ch. D. 26 (C.A.) at 26. Cowen & da Costa, supra note 48, at 182. 
 55 [1878] 8 Ch. D. 26 (C.A.) at 27. 
 56 Id. 
 57 Id. 
 58 Id. at 37. 
 59 Id. Accord, Austrian Lloyd S.S. Co. v. Gresham Life Assurance Soc’y [1903] KB 1 at 249, 
252 (Eng.); Johnson v. Macheilsne, (1811) 170 Eng. Rep. 1300, 1300 (C.P.). See also Zapata Off-
Shore Co. v. M/S Bremen, 428 F.2d 888, 900 (5th Cir. 1970) (Wisdom, J., dissenting); Cowen & 
da Costa, supra note 48, at 186. 
 60 See cases listed at Cowen & da Costa, supra note 48, at 182; see also supra note 25 and 
accompanying text. 
 61 See generally Cowen & da Costa, supra note 48, at 183. 
 62 “ . . . it is clear, as a matter of common law, that the [English] courts have a discretion to 
grant or refuse a stay.” See Cowen & da Costa, supra note 48, at 183. For additional cases enforcing 
forum clauses, see id. at 181–86; supra note 25. For cases rejecting forum clauses, see Cowen & da 
Costa, supra note 48, at 183–85, reporting cases from Australia, Quebec, and The Fehmarn, [1958] 
WLR (CA) at 159 (Eng.), an English example “going to the verge of the law.” See Cowen & da 
Costa, supra note 48, at 186. 
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B.  Forum Clauses in the United States 
The reporting of forum-clause evolution in the United States both 
coincides and contrasts with that in England. The coinciding is twofold: 
American law was drawn from English precedent, and both mixed the 
analysis between distinct doctrinal areas such as arbitration, admiralty, and 
foreign court litigation. The contrast is the greater American tendency to mix 
doctrinal areas, and a greater distortion in reporting history. The distorted 
reports drew a sharp line between Bremen and its predecessors, 
characterizing the years before 1972 as categorical rejection of forum clauses 
and Bremen and its progeny as a reasoned development of the law. The more 
insightful histories describe a nuanced treatment of forum clauses back to 
1795, even though forum clause rejection was the majority view. The Bremen 
boundary is nonetheless appropriate because it marks the shift from ouster as 
a majority view to the strong presumption that Bremen put in motion and led 
to the extreme under Atlantic Marine. 
A good example of divided American law and the ouster rule’s non-
uniformity was the differing statements in two first-series Restatements. The 
Restatement (First) Contracts, labeled forum clauses illegal if unreasonable,63 
while the Restatement (First) Conflict of Laws noted in a comment that courts 
would usually give effect to forum clauses unless they were unfair or 
unreasonable.64 Although these two sections both support reasonable forum 
clauses, their wording nonetheless shows differing approaches which courts 
noted in struggling with the uncertain law.65 The Restatement (Second) 
Contracts does not take a position on this issue66 and the Restatement 
(Second) Conflict of Laws is consistent with its predecessor.67 
 
 63 “A bargain to forego a privilege, that otherwise would exist, to litigate in a Federal Court 
rather than in a State Court, or in a State Court rather than in a Federal Court, or otherwise to limit 
unreasonably the tribunal to which resort may be had for the enforcement of a possible future right 
of action or the time within which a possible future claim may be asserted, is illegal.” RESTATEMENT 
(FIRST) OF CONTRACTS § 558 (AM. LAW INST. 1932). 
 64 RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 617 cmt. a (AM. LAW INST. 1934). 
 65 See, e.g., Wm. H. Muller & Co. v. Swedish Am. Line Ltd., 224 F.2d 806, 808 (1955) 
(comparing the working of the two Restatements). 
 66 See Capital Bank & Tr. Co. v. Associated Int’l Ins. Co., 576 F. Supp. 1522, 1526 (M.D. La. 
1984) (noting the absence of a forum clause provision in the Restatement (Second) of Contracts).  
 67 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) CONFLICT OF LAWS § 80 (AM. LAW INST. 1988). 
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1. Distorted Pre-Bremen Histories 
Historical accounts of American forum-clause practice, both judicial and 
academic, have tended to paint with a bright line typified by the Supreme 
Court’s account in Bremen: 
Forum selection clauses have historically not been favored 
by American courts. Many courts, federal and state, have 
declined to enforce such clauses on the ground that they were 
‘contrary to public policy,’ or that their effect was to ‘oust 
the jurisdiction of the court.68  
While the description “not been favored” is partly accurate in the sense that 
many courts rejected forum clauses under the ouster doctrine, it ignores the 
many cases enforcing forum clauses going back to 1796.69 In addition, 
putatively accurate statements like this were summarized in even more 
misleading categorical terms: 
Historically, American courts refused to enforce such 
provisions, usually on a theory that they constituted 
improper effort by private parties to ‘oust’ a governmental 
body, the judicial system, of its power over dispute 
resolution. The ouster theory started to wane in the mid-
twentieth century in some state and lower federal courts, 
pushed by emerging embrace of freedom of contract.70  
And another: 
Early on, American courts refused to honor exclusive forum 
selection clauses on the theory that they effected an illegal 
‘ouster’ of the court’s jurisdiction. As of 1950, one 
commentator could report that with almost boring unanimity 
 
 68 The Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1, 9 (1972). 
 69 See, e.g., Gienar v. Meyer, (1796) 126 Eng. Rep. 728, 731 (C.P.). 
 70 14D CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 3803.1 (4th 
ed. 2013) (citing Bremen, 407 U.S. at 9–11) (footnotes omitted) [hereinafter 14D Wright & Miller]. 
Wright & Miller’s historical account is based only on Bremen and an 1874 case, Home Ins. Co. v. 
Morse, 87 U.S. 445 (1874), and not a case analysis. In spite of my disagreement with this treatise’s 
conclusion, it is an excellent source for post-Bremen issues. 
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American courts have refused to enforce contractual 
provisions conferring exclusive jurisdiction on a court or 
courts of a sister state or foreign country.71 
This bright-line view is found in many cases and commentaries72 and 
includes the notion that Bremen marked a sea-change to reasonable 
acceptance in 1972.73 The second categorical conclusion is true not only 
because of the shift in presumption and burden of proof. In ensuing cases, 
that presumption strengthened like an Atlantic tropical storm, culminating 
fittingly with Atlantic Marine. In quantifying forum clause rejection in the 
United States, those studies fail to consider a crucial category—unreported 
dismissal which were not appealed.74 A derogating plaintiff whose case is 
dismissed based on the forum clause has the option of filing in the contractual 
forum. Pursuing that alternative may be preferable to appealing in the original 
forum. In contrast, where the derogating forum rejects the forum clause and 
keeps the case, that defendant (often the deep pocket) may have a higher 
incentive to appeal in order to get the contracted-for forum and whatever 
advantages it offers. The accounts of ouster dominance assume that the 
appeal rate for these two categories is the same and that unreported dismissals 
 
 71 PETER HAY, PATRICK J. BORCHERS & SYMEON C. SYMEONIDES, CONFLICT OF LAWS § 11.3 
at 536 (5th ed. 2010) (quoting Note 9, William E. Skye, Agreements in Advance Conferring 
Exclusive Jurisdiction on Foreign Courts, 10 LA. L. REV. 293, 293 (1949) (which notes exceptions 
to its sweeping conclusion of “almost boring unanimity”)). 
 72 Cases with categorical rejections are discussed throughout this section. For a relatively recent 
example of categorical forum-clause rejection, see Redwing Carriers, Inc. v. Foster, 382 So. 2d 554, 
556 (Ala. 1980), overruled by Prof’l Ins. Corp. v. Sutherland, 700 So. 2d 347, 351 (Ala. 1997); 
Dowling v. NADW Mktg, Inc., 578 S.W.2d 475, 475 (Tex. App.—Eastland 1979), rev’d on other 
grounds, 631 S.W.2d 726 (Tex. 1982); see also GARY B. BORN & PETER B. RUTLEDGE, 
INTERNATIONAL CIVIL LITIGATION IN UNITED STATES COURTS 436–42 (4th ed. 2007) [hereinafter 
Born & Rutledge]; James P. George, Parallel Litigation, 51 BAYLOR L. REV. 769, 913 (1999) 
[hereinafter George]. 
 73 Professor Yackee used the sea-change metaphor in analyzing Atlantic Marine and noting the 
prevalence of admiralty settings in forum clause history. See Jason Yackee, Choice of Law 
Considerations in the Validity and Enforcement of International Forum Selection Agreements: 
Whose Law Applies?, 9 U.C.L.A. J. INT’L & FOR. AFF. 43, 43 (2004). 
 74 See, e.g., Francis M. Dougherty, Annotation, Validity of Contractual Provisions Limiting 
Place or Court in Which Action May Be Brought, 31 A.L.R. 4th 404 (1984). 
 
7 GEORGE (DO NOT DELETE) 6/18/2019  11:19 AM 
2019] FORUM CLAUSES AT THE MARGIN 283 
   
 
would not alter the calculation. There is no way to capture that data, but the 
assumption of equivalence is questionable. 
The more accurate historical accounts included contemporaries of the 
misstated histories. In a 1901 opinion, then Massachusetts Justice Holmes 
upheld a forum clause and noted that “courts are less and less disposed to 
interfere with parties making such contracts as they choose, so long as they 
interfere with no one’s welfare but their own.”75 In the 1919 Harvard Law 
Review, Joseph Beale pointed out a conflict between two recent forum-clause 
cases and concluded that, “in view of the paucity of authorities such a conflict 
of decision leave the law most uncertain.”76 Beale was wrong about the 
paucity of authority and his sample was too small to justify his conclusion, 
but he was right about the law being inconclusive. Beale later took a position 
on the issue when he served as Reporter for the first Restatement of Conflict 
of Laws, which noted that contracting parties “may provide that all actions 
for breach of the contract shall be brought only in a certain courts, and the 
courts of other states will usually give effect to such a provision.”77 The better 
accounts continued through the twentieth century, perhaps highlighted by 
Judge’s Wisdom’s dissent in the appellate Bremen opinion.78 
Even with the correcting histories, myths persisted. Some myths defended 
the ouster doctrine, such as the argument that courts had always seen it this 
way and that it was an affront to justice to allow parties to agree on the 
litigation site.79 Other myths attacked the ouster doctrine, and one was the 
 
 75 Daley v. People’s Bldg., Loan & Sav. Assoc., 59 N.E. 452, 453 (Mass. 1901). 
 76 Joseph Beale, Progress of the Law, 1918-19, 33 HARV. L. REV. 1, 21–22 (1919), contrasting 
Kuhnhold v. Compagnie Generale Transatlantique, 251 F. 387, 388 (S.D.N.Y. 1918) (declined 
French forum clause) with Mittenthal v. Mascagni, 66 N.E. 425, 427 (Mass. 1903) (enforced forum 
clause). 
 77 RESTATEMENT (FIRST) CONFLICT OF LAWS § 617 cmt. a (AM. LAW INST. 1934). 
 78 See Zapata Off-Shore Co. v. M/S Bremen, 428 F.2d 888, 896–905 (5th Cir. 1970) (Wisdom, 
J., dissenting); see also ALBERT EHRENZWEIG, CONFLICT OF LAWS 147 et seq. (1959) [hereinafter 
Ehrenzweig] (first edition used here to utilize Ehrenzweig’s earliest view); Carrington & Castle, 
supra note 24, at 208–20; David Marcus, The Perils of Contract Procedure: A Revised History of 
Forum Selection Clauses in the Federal Courts, 82 TUL. L. REV. 973, 993–1015 (2008) [hereinafter 
Perils of Contract Procedure]. 
 79 See, e.g., Carbon Black Export, Inc. v. The SS Monrosa, 254 F.2d 297, 300–01 (5th Cir. 
1958) (“[A]greements in advance of controversy whose object is to oust the jurisdiction of the courts 
are contrary to the public policy and will not be enforced.”). 
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idea that early English courts developed the ouster doctrine to protect their 
political and financial interests.80 Of course, judges are not only human, but 
also political functionaries, and there are indeed examples of turf struggles, 
such as the battle between law and equity courts.81 But those other turf 
struggles do not reduce every doctrine to political motives. As to the ouster 
doctrine in particular, history provides non-self-serving explanations.82 Even 
so, the attribution of ill motive was a good way to ridicule the practice, and 
this happened with scholars and courts ranging from state courts83 to the 
Supreme Court in Bremen: 
The argument that such clauses are improper because they 
tend to ‘oust’ a court of jurisdiction is hardly more than a 
vestigial legal fiction. It appears to rest at core on historical 
judicial resistance to any attempt to reduce the power and 
business of a particular court and has little place in an era 
when all courts are overloaded and when businesses once 
essentially local now operate in world markets.84  
This language is a predicate for the extreme presumption now favoring forum 
clauses in every range of contract, even though sources well before Bremen 
persuasively refuted this, and ironically one was Judge Wisdom dissenting in 
Bremen’s appellate opinion.85 
 
 80 The judicial turf myth appears to have originated with Lord Campbell’s statement in Scott v. 
Avery, (1856) 10 Eng. Rep. 1121, 1138 (H.L.) (judicial hostility to arbitration clauses “probably 
originated in the contests of the different courts in ancient times for extent of jurisdiction, all of 
them being opposed to anything that would deprive one of them of jurisdiction.”). The court offered 
no supporting evidence and later analyses have refuted this. See infra notes 124–126. 
 81 See F. W. MAITLAND, EQUITY 9 (A. H. CHAYTOR & W.J. WHITTAKER EDS., REV. 2d 1936) 
(referring to the “great quarrel between Lord Coke and Lord Ellesmere”). 
 82 See Zapata, 428 F.2d at 899–900 (Wisdom dissenting); See also Carrington & Castle, supra 
note 24, at 210–11. 
 83 “Courts guard with jealous eye any contract innovations upon their jurisdiction.”  First Nat’l 
Bank of Kan. City v. White, 120 S.W. 36, 42 (Mo. 1909) (dictum commenting on the ouster doctrine 
in a confession of judgment case with a prorogating forum clause).  
 84 407 U.S. 1, 12 (1972). 
 85 See Zapata, 428 F.2d at 899 (Wisdom dissenting); See also Carrington & Castle, supra note 
24 at 210–11. 
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In spite of the misstated histories in cases and commentaries, it is 
nonetheless true that ouster was the majority rule and forum clauses were 
often rejected, in many cases by a rigid rule.86 Whatever the degree of 
pendulum swing, Bremen marked a change that put the forum clause in a 
presumptively-favored position.87 There are various theories for what drove 
the shift, with many attributing it to the emergence of contractual autonomy 
in the twentieth century.88 That view tends to subscribe to the bright-line split 
before and after Bremen and ignores cases approving forum clauses back to 
1795. Another view, tying into contractual autonomy, is the changing view 
of venue and even personal jurisdiction.89  
2. Actual Pre-Bremen Case Law 
The following cases illustrate the analytical and doctrinal jumble that 
spawned Bremen and Atlantic Marine. They are topically grouped here for 
comparison purposes, that is, cases involving aliens should have some 
doctrinal consistency. But the grouping also illustrates the tendency to mix 
topical areas, blending precedents not only for arbitration and foreign court 
litigation clauses (as England did),90 but also such mixes as state courts using 
admiralty precedents91 and federal courts using English arbitration 
precedents for conflicts between state and federal courts in removal cases.92 
The ouster doctrine was merely the majority rule with notable exceptions 
going back to 1795 and before. In Thompson v. The Catharina, sailors filed 
 
 86 See, e.g., Carbon Black Exp., Inc. v. The SS Monrosa, 254 F.2d 297, 301 (5th Cir. 1958). 
 87 Marcus, supra note 78, at 975–76. 
 88 See, e.g., Arthur R. Miller, What Are Courts for: Have We Forsaken the Procedural Gold 
Standard, 78 LA. L. REV. 739, 773–86 (2018). 
 89 David H. Taylor, The Forum Selection Clause: A Tale of Two Concepts, 66 TEMPLE L. REV. 
785, 785–88 (1993) [hereinafter Tale of Two Concepts] (noting the conflicting concepts of 
venue/fairness versus contract autonomy). 
 90 See 14D Wright & Miller, supra note 70, at 59; see also Kelvin Eng’g Co. v. Blanco, 210 
N.Y.S. 10, 16 (N.Y. App. Div. 1925) (forum clause pointing to litigation in Santiago, Chile 
approved under New York arbitration law). For an English example, see Law v. Garrett, (1878) 8 
Ch. D. 26, 37, 39 (C.A.) (the Common Law Procedure Act used to approve forum clause specifying 
litigation in Russia). 
 91 See Marcus, supra note 78, at 1002–03, n.170, 171. 
 92 See infra notes 153–74 and accompanying text. 
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an admiralty claim against their ship, The Catharina, for back wages.93 
Defendant ship owner moved to dismiss based on the claimants’ prior 
agreement to bring all claims in the home port, which is not identified.94 The 
court noted at the outset that it had experience with such claims and 
considered the forum clauses generally valid: “On several occasions, I have 
seen it part of the contract, that the mariners should not sue in any other than 
their own courts;—and I consider such a contract lawful.”95 Because this case 
involved both foreign and American sailors, the court split its ruling.96 Noting 
that the foreign sailors were contractually obligated to return to the home 
port, the court dismissed their claims for filing there.97 Two American sailors 
were awarded wages, not necessarily because they were forum citizens but 
because their contracts specified discharge in the United States.98 The court 
based its forum-clause opinion in large part on a choice of law analysis,99 a 
question still unresolved in the United States. 
The first example of the ouster doctrine is said to be Nute v. Hamilton in 
1856 even though Nute never mentioned the ouster doctrine or even used the 
term ouster.100 It did, however, reject a forum clause as improperly 
supplanting venue.101 Nute involved an insurance policy with a forum clause 
limiting litigation to Essex County in Massachusetts where the insurer was 
located.102 When plaintiff’s claim arose, he filed in his home county—
Suffolk.103 The two counties are adjacent and the county sits about twenty 
miles apart, and though that twenty miles would have been more significant 
in the mid-1800s, it is likely that the insurance company used the forum 
 
 93 23 F. Cas. 1028, 1028 (D. Pa. 1795) (No. 13,949). 
 94 Id. 
 95 Id. 1028. The court’s statement of its own experience with similar claims and defenses 
indicates favorable forum clause opinions before 1795. 
 96 Id. at 1031, n.10. 
 97 Id. 
 98 Id. 
 99 Id. passim. 
 100 72 Mass. (6 Gray) 174 (1856). 
 101 Id. at 174. 
 102 Id. at 176. 
 103 Id. at 175. 
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clause for goals other than saving the twenty-mile trip, as hinted in the court’s 
opinion.104  
The court disallowed the forum clause, noting that rejection was not based 
on public policy (nonetheless citing some), but on the basis that forum 
clauses would upset the symmetry of venue rules, bring justice into disrepute, 
and subject disputes to counties where a party had greater influence.105 Rather 
than English or American precedent, the court based its decision on the 
distinction between rights and remedies.106 Under the prevalent view then, 
rights could be created and modified by contract, but remedies—including 
forum selection—were public matters governed by forum law and not subject 
to contract.107 In distinguishing the defendant insurer’s argument for 
honoring the forum clause, the court noted that, “Most of the cases cited, both 
English and American, are conditions annexed to the contract . . . .”108 and 
thus substantive rights rather than the remedial right defendant was claiming 
here. The court referred to no ouster cases and concluded, “There being no 
authority upon which to determine the case it must be decided upon 
principle.”109 The court did not mention the ouster theory, although its public 
policy references seem to invoke an ouster basis—private agreements cannot 
displace jurisdiction or venue. With this, Nute became an American 
precedent for rejecting forum clauses although the reasoning seems too 
equivocal to bear that burden. Interestingly, Ohio did not overrule Nute until 
1995.110 
a. Admiralty Cases 
When reading the 1795 Thompson case, it is tempting to dismiss 
admiralty examples as a distinct area governed by their own transnational law 
 
 104 “It might happen that a mutual insurance company, in which every holder of a policy is a 
member, and of course interested, would embrace so large a part of the men of property and business 
in the county, that it would be difficult to find an impartial and intelligent jury.” Id. at 184. 
 105 Id. 
 106 Id. 
 107 Id. at 183–85. 
 108 Id. at 184. 
 109 Id. at 185. 
 110 See Jacobson v. Mailboxes Etc. U.S.A., Inc., 646 N.E.2d 741, 746 (Mass. 1995). 
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and special fact settings. That argument makes sense except that courts 
ignored those distinctions—admiralty and maritime cases have played a 
constant but erratic role in American forum clause development, from 
Thompson to Bremen and Carnival Cruise.111 Because of admiralty’s primary 
role in American forum-clause law, the summary here will briefly outline 
some points and then defer to the larger discussion of specific cases below. 
Until Bremen, cases went both ways partly because of a circuit split, but 
also because of differing views at the time.112 One instructive contrast is Wm. 
H Muller & Co. v. Swedish American Linde, Ltd., a claim for lost cargo with 
a clause limiting litigation to Swedish courts.113 The trial and appellate courts 
enforced it, but with the Second Circuit noting the conflicting views, 
including conflicts in the Restatements.114 When a federal district court in 
Texas applied Muller to honor a forum clause pointing to Genoa, Italy, the 
Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed it, announcing a categorical rule 
against forum clauses.115 
The conflicting views existed not only between circuits and courts, but 
also in the changing views of particular judges. Wood & Selick, Inc. v. 
Compagnie Generale Transatlantique was an admiralty claim for damage to 
shipped goods, involving bills of lading with French forum clauses.116 In 
rejecting those clauses and upholding jurisdiction, Judge Learned Hand 
stated: 
We may at the start lay aside the clauses in the bills of lading, 
which apparently were intended to confine any litigation 
over the contracts to a French court. The respondent does not 
 
 111 See infra notes 147–63 and 179–97. 
 112 Admiralty cases following the ouster doctrine include Prince Steam-Shipping Co. v. Lehman 
39 F. 704, 704 (S.D.N.Y. 1889) and cases cited at Marus, supra note 78, at 999 and n.153. Cases 
enforcing forum clauses include Thompson and cases cited at Marcus, supra note 78, at 1000, n.156–
57. 
 113 224 F.2d 806, 806 (2d Cir. 1955). 
 114 Id. at 808. 
 115 See Carbon Black Exp., Inc. v. The SS Monrosa, 254 F.2d 297 (5th Cir. 1958). 
 116 43 F.2d 941 (2d Cir. 1930). 
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pretend that, so, construed, these would be valid, and it is of 
course well settled that they would not.117 
In assessing Hand’s position, it is important to keep in mind that admiralty 
cases provide common examples of honoring forum clauses.118 We can 
conclude from his 1930 statement that Hand subscribed to the bright-line 
view of forum clause history. That changed by 1949. In his concurrence in a 
non-admiralty case in 1949, Hand deemed the law not to bar forum clauses 
categorically, but he “would hold such contracts unenforceable unless the 
road [sic] shows that the employee was fully advised of their effect upon his 
rights.”119 
b. Arbitration and the Scott v. Avery Clause 
American courts began citing Scott v. Avery in the same year it was 
rendered in England. In Cobb v. New England Mutual Marine Ins. Co., the 
court rejected an arbitration clause on ouster grounds, but noted the Scott v. 
Avery decision and predicted a changing attitude in the law.120 American 
courts cited Scott dozens of time in the decades after that, often to enforce its 
ouster language121 but sometimes to approve an arbitration agreement that 
served as a condition precedent to litigation.122 Scott was cited as approving 
the ouster doctrine123 often enough that it may be that many American courts 
did not understand its conditioned approval of arbitration clauses. In 1890 the 
United States Supreme Court set that straight in two cases that accurately 
 
 117 Id. at 942. 
 118 For an historical account of admiralty cases honoring forum clauses, see Marcus, supra note 
78, at 996–1002 and 1005–07. 
 119 Krenger v. Pa. R.R. Co., 174 F.2d 556, 561 (2d Cir. 1949) (Hand, J., concurring).  Hand’s 
concurrence in Krenger can be read as limited to the statutory protection of employees under the 
Federal Employer’s Liability Act, but is also interpreted as his changing view, or perhaps a 
correction of his hardline view in Wood & Selick.  See Contractual Restrictions, supra note 1, at 
442. 
 120 72 Mass. (6 Gray) 192, 204 (1856). 
 121 See Hostetter v. City of Pittsburgh, 107 Pa. 419, 429 (1884). 
 122 See Holmes v. Richet, 56 Cal. 307, 313–14 (1880). 
 123 The citations for Scott v. Avery on merely the point of endorsing the ouster doctrine included 
Judge Wisdom’s otherwise well-reasoned dissent in Zapata. See Zapata Off-Shore Co. v. M/S 
Bremen, 428 F.2d 888, 899 (5th Cir. 1970). 
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stated the English doctrine. The two Supreme Court cases involved the same 
plaintiff (Hamilton, a tobacco merchant) with claims against different 
insurers whose policies required cost appraisal for damage claims prior to 
litigation.124 Although the two Hamilton cases did not deal with arbitration 
clauses, per se, the Supreme Court used the English doctrine as an analytical 
tool, approving the clause in one case and rejecting it in the other case 
because that clause was not properly drafted as a condition precedent to 
litigation.125 The Supreme Court’s accurate application of Scott v. Avery led 
to equally accurate applications in lower courts.126 
c. Claims Involving Aliens 
The inclusion in a lawsuit of foreign people or entities provided an early 
basis to ignore the ouster rule and enforce a forum clause designating 
litigation or arbitration elsewhere. The lead example is also the first reported 
forum-clause case in the United States, The Catharina,127 and it became 
common to honor forum clauses involving entirely foreign parties.128 Of 
course, the degree of the foreign elements varied. The often-cited Mittenthal 
v. Mascagni was a dispute between plaintiffs referred to as “New York 
citizens” who had contractually designated their domicile in Florence, Italy, 
and the famous composer Italian Pietro Mascagni, regarding Mascagni’s 
American tour.129 When plaintiffs sued in Massachusetts, the court honored 
 
 124 See Hamilton v. Liverpool & London & Globe Ins. Co., 136 U.S. 242, 255 (1890) (clause 
approved as not ousting jurisdiction); Hamilton v. Home Ins. Co., 137 U.S. 370, 386 (1890) (clause 
disapproved as not being a proper condition precedent to litigation).  
 125 Liverpool, 136 U.S. at 255; Home, 137 U.S. at 385. 
 126 See, e.g., Kulukundis Shipping Co. v. Amtorg Trading Corp., 126 F.2d 978, 989 (2d Cir. 
1942) (Judge Jerome Frank reversing the trial court’s rejection of the arbitration clause and 
criticizing its erroneous English and American history recital); Mittenthal v. Mascagni, 66 N.E. 425, 
426 (Mass. 1903) (citing many other Massachusetts cases correctly applying Scott v. Avery); 
Fontano v. Robbins, 18 App. D.C. 402, 415 (1901) (citing both Hamilton cases in explaining the 
proper function of a Scott v. Avery clause). 
 127 23 F. Cas. 1028 (D. Pa. 1795) (No. 13,949). See supra notes 93–99 and accompanying text. 
 128 See cases cited at Perils of Contract Procedure, supra note 78, at 1000, n.157. 
 129 66 N.E. 425 (honoring an Italian forum clause in a contract between a plaintiff residing in 
New York but maintaining Italian citizenship, and an Italian composer touring the United States).  
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the parties’ Italian forum clause based on the Italian contacts and an 
inconvenient forum analysis.130 
On the other hand, American courts were reluctant to enforce forum 
clauses in which an American had submitted himself to a foreign court or 
tribunal.131 The presence of one foreign party raised a different question: 
should American courts enforce forum-court clauses where an American 
citizen contractually subjected himself to that court? Even here, though, there 
are exceptions enforcing the foreign-court clause. One example is Kelvin 
Engineering Co. v. Blanco,132 involving a construction contract for a Cuban 
sugar mill with a forum clause limiting litigation to Santiago, Cuba. Although 
the parties’ citizenship is not stated, one defendant lived in Cuba and the other 
two likely lived in Cuba as well, because the contract was made in Cuba for 
work to be done there.133 Plaintiff Kelvin’s home base can be inferred as 
American based on its choice of a New York forum. Defendants objected to 
the New York filing based on a forum clause limiting litigation to Santiago, 
Cuba.134 The court characterized the clause as one for arbitration, even 
though it called for litigation, and cited English precedents applying the 
English arbitration statute to foreign litigation clauses.135 
d. Statutory Bars 
The Supreme Court noted in Bremen that forum clauses were not 
enforceable if they “would contravene a strong public policy of the forum in 
which suit is brought, whether declared by statute or by judicial decision.”136 
That is, statutes may bar forum clause enforcement. Although Bremen 
 
 130 Id. at 426–27; See also Cerro de Pasco Copper Corp. v. Knut Knutson O.A.S., 187 F.2d 990, 
991 (2d Cir. 1951) (enforced forum clause on the basis of forum non conveniens where all parties 
and property were foreign); See generally, Perils of Contract Procedure, supra note 78, at 996–
1005, esp. notes 130, 154–57, 170, 182–87. 
 131 See Ehrenzweig, supra note 78, at 149 & nn. 21–26. 
 132 210 N.Y.S. 10 (N.Y. App. Div. 1925). 
 133 Id. at 12. 
 134 Id. at 13. 
 135 Id. at 732, citing inter alia Austrian Lloyd S.S. Co. v. Gresham Life Assurance Soc’y [1903] 
KB 1 at 249 (Eng.) and Law v. Garrett (1878) 8 Ch. D. 26 (C.A.). 
 136 The Bremen v. Zapata Off-shore Co., 407 U.S. 1, 15 (1972), discussed at Yackee, supra note 
73, at 79. 
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mentions the point only in passing, the point arose in Mitsubishi Motors 
Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, where the court observed in dictum that, 
if the arbitration clause at issue denied parties access to their antitrust remedy, 
the clause would not be enforced: 
 . . . in the event the choice-of-forum and choice-of-law 
clauses operated in tandem as a prospective waiver of a 
party’s right to pursue statutory remedies for antitrust 
violations, we would have little hesitation in condemning the 
agreement as against public policy.137 
In addition to the implied bar under the antitrust statutes, courts have read 
some federal statutes as express bars of contrary forum clauses.138 Other 
cases, however, struggled with the issue. Krenger v. Pennsylvania R. Co.is 
an example, with three notable federal circuit judges taking different views, 
two rejecting the clause.139 When Krenger was injured on the job, he signed 
a post-accident agreement with Pennsylvania Railroad not to file suit 
anywhere but the injury situs or his domicile at the time of the accident.140 In 
return, his employer gave Krenger $1,750 for interim expenses.141 The 
accident occurred in Ohio where Krenger also lived, but Krenger disregarded 
it and sued in federal court in New York.142 Judge Clark held for Krenger 
based on his interpretation of “liability” in the Federal Employers’ Liability 
Act, which Clark concluded cast a critical eye, but not an absolute bar on 
post-accident agreements regarding litigation.143 Judge Learned Hand 
concurred based on common law history for this statutory claim, from which 
Hand gleaned that “courts have for long looked with strong disfavor upon 
contract by which a party surrenders resort to any forum which was lawfully 
 
 137 473 U.S. 614, 637 n.19 (1985) (citations omitted), discussed at Yackee, supra note 73, at 63, 
n.104. 
 138 See, e.g., Balt. & Ohio R.R. Co. v. Kepner, 314 U.S. 44, 54 (1941) (FELA venue statute 
barred contrary forum clause). The enactment of the intra-federal inconvenient forum statute, 28 
U.S.C. § 1404 (2013) superseded Kepner. See Ex parte Collett, 337 U.S. 55, 58 (1949). 
 139 174 F.2d 556 (2d Cir. 1949). 
 140 Id. at 557. 
 141 Id. at 557–58. 
 142 Id. 
 143 Id. at 559–60. 
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open to him.”144 But Hand also noted that, “In truth, I do not believe that, 
today at least, there is an absolute taboo against such contracts at all . . . .”145 
Judge Swan dissented, with the argument that, because a plaintiff chooses 
venue when filing the suit, plaintiff should also be able to choose venue 
contractually before the suit.146 Other federal statutes have voided forum 
clauses under the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act147 and the Miller Act, for 
payment to a government subcontractor.148 The purported statutory bar failed 
under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act,149 the Credit Repair 
Organization Act,150 a state anti-waiver provision for securities fraud class 
actions,151 and, notably, in Carnival Cruise and Atlantic Marine.152 
 
 144 Id. at 560 (Hand, C.J., concurring). 
 145 Id. at 561 (Hand, C.J., concurring) (citing RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF CONTRACTS § 558 
(AM. LAW INST., 1932)). 
 146 Id. at 561 (Swan, J., dissenting). 
 147 Indussa Corp. v. S.S. Ramborg, 377 F.2d 200, 204 (2d Cir. 1967) (invalidating a forum 
clause that violated the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act, 46 U.S.C. §§ 1300–1315 (1913)). 
 148 40 U.S.C. §§ 270a, 270b, now codified as 46 U.S.C. §§ 3131, 3133 (2013), barring a forum 
clause in United States v. Essential Const. Co., 261 F. Supp. 715, 718–19 (D. Md. 1966). See Perils 
of Contract Procedure, supra note 78, at 1011, n.224. 
 149 See Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 23 (1991) (enforced arbitration 
clause). 
 150 CompuCredit Corp. v. Greenwood, 565 U.S. 95, 104 (2012) (15 U.S.C. §§ 1679 et seq. 
(2013) did not bar a forum clause). See also Steven E. Sachs, The Forum Selection Defense, 10 
DUKE J. CONST. L. & PUB. POL’Y 1, 8 (2014). 
 151 Pong v. Am. Capital Holdings, Inc., No. CIV S-06-2527 LKK/DAD, 2007 WL 657790, at 
*5 (E.D. Cal. Feb. 28, 2007) (Cal. Corp. Code § 25701, did not bar a forum clause). 
 152 The Limitation of Vessel Owners Liability Act, 46 U.S. C. App. § 183C, now codified at 46 
U.S.C. § 30509 (2013) invalidates contractual limitations on shipowners’ liability. The Supreme 
Court rejected plaintiffs’ argument that the Florida forum clause violated the Act because it rendered 
their remedy ineffective. See 499 U.S. 585, 596–97(1991); See generally Michael E. Solomine, 
Forum-Selection Clauses and the Privatization of Procedure, 25 CORNELL INT’L L. J. 51. 85–92 
(1992) [hereinafter Solomine]. TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE ANN. § 272.001(b) (West Supp.) (the 
statute at the time of the litigation) bars forum clauses for construction contracts regarding real 
property located in Texas.  In Atlantic Marine, the district court found Texas law inapplicable 
because the property was at Fort Hood, a United States Army post.  See United States ex rel. J-Crew 
Mgmt. Inc. v. Atl. Marine Constr. Co., No. A-12-CV-228-LY, 2012 WL 8499879, at *3 (W.D. Tex. 
Aug. 6, 2012). 
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e. Federalism 
American cases presented a category that did not exist in England—the 
relationship of state and federal courts. Two issues resulted: whether state or 
federal law governs a forum clause in federal court, and conflicts regarding 
the right to remove a case from state to federal court. Courts are still 
struggling with the first issue, but the second was resolved almost a century 
ago. 
Governing law was not an issue at first. Admiralty claims account for 
many of the early (and even later) forum clause cases. Admiralty is federal 
common law, and the forum-clause law that developed in those cases was 
accordingly federal (even though the contract itself could arguably come 
under state law). But what law applies when the federal court sits in diversity? 
This was not a problem prior to 1938, but when the Supreme Court handed 
down Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins, parties were able to argue that 
oppositional state law (whether or not it used the term “ouster”) compelled 
the forum clause’s rejection, contrary to federal common law that was more 
inclined to honor the clauses.153 In Atlantic Marine, the Supreme Court failed 
to address governing law.154 The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals provided a 
workable answer in Weber, the case on which this article focuses, but 
consensus still evades us both as to federal diversity cases in federal court,155 
and forum clauses in general.156 
 
 153 304 U.S. 64, 64 (1938); See, e.g., Int’l Software Sys., Inc. v. Amplicon, Inc., 77 F.3d 112, 
113 (5th Cir. 1996).  See also Linda S. Mullenix, Another Choice of Forum, Another Choice of Law: 
Consensual Adjudicatory Procedure in Federal Court, 57 FORDHAM L. REV. 291, 332–33, n.214 
(1988) [hereinafter Another Choice of Forum]; Stephen E. Sachs, Five Questions After Atlantic 
Marine, 66 HASTINGS L. J. 761, 767, n.40–41 (2015) [hereinafter Five Questions]. 
 154 See Five Questions, supra note 153, at 766 (citing to Atl. Marine, 571 U.S. at 62 n.5 for the 
point at which the Court assumed the forum clause’s validity without discussing which law 
determined it); Adam N. Steinman, Atlantic Marine Through the Lens of Erie, 66 HASTINGS L. J. 
795, 796 (2015) (discussing Atlantic Marine’s lack of any discussion of state law’s possible 
governing role in forum clause analysis). 
 155 See Five Questions, supra note 153, at 766–71; Kevin M. Clermont, Governing Law on 
Forum-Selection Agreements, 66 HASTINGS L.J. 643, 664–68 (2015) [hereinafter Governing Law]. 
See also infra note 222. 
 156 See 811 F.3d 758, 770–75 (5th Cir. 2016) (applying the forum state’s choice of law rules to 
interpretation, and federal law to enforceability); See infra notes 214–15 and accompanying text. 
 
7 GEORGE (DO NOT DELETE) 6/18/2019  11:19 AM 
2019] FORUM CLAUSES AT THE MARGIN 295 
   
 
The removal issue arose from state statutes penalizing removal to federal 
court. Forum clauses often benefit corporations but the anti-removal statutes 
were typically designed for local residents, assuring them a state forum and 
avoiding Swift v. Tyson’s federal general common law that tended to favor 
corporate interests.157 Commercial entities, especially non-resident 
companies, understandably sought a federal forum that applied a more 
nationally uniform business law.158 Although diversity removal was not 
possible if all parties were from the same state, non-resident corporations 
could remove as long as there was no co-defendant from the forum state.159 
And they did remove, often enough that some states passed laws penalizing 
the removing corporations. The typical penalty was withdrawal of 
authorization to do business in that state. 
When defendants challenged these statutes, courts applied varying legal 
theories including the English common law’s ouster doctrine and the 
constitutional right to a federal forum for diversity cases. Even the United 
States Supreme Court engaged in this mixed analysis, highlighted in three 
inconsistent opinions in Wisconsin-based cases. In the first case, Wisconsin 
had a statute requiring foreign insurers (that is, insurers from outside 
Wisconsin) to waive the right to remove a case to federal court as an incident 
of registering to do business in Wisconsin.160 Wisconsin resident Morse filed 
a claim against New York-based Home Insurance Company in a Wisconsin 
state court.161 At that time, removal procedure required defendant to file a 
petition for removal in the state court, which the state court was then required 
by federal law to turn over to a federal court.162 The Wisconsin state court 
denied the petition on the basis of the Wisconsin insurance statute, and the 
 
 157 41 U.S. 1 (1842), overruled by Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 64 (1938). 
 158 See generally JACK FRIEDENTHAL ET AL., CIVIL PROCEDURE § 4.1 at 197–200 (5th ed. 
2015). 
 159 See 28 U.S.C. § 1441(b) (2013) for the current statement of a removal limit that’s been 
around in varying language since it first appeared in Section 12 of Judiciary Act of 1789, 1 Stat. 73 
(Sept. 24, 1789); see also Martin v. Snyder, 148 U.S. 663, 664 (1893) (citing the Judiciary Act of 
1887, Act of Congress of March 3, 1887 (24 St. p.552, c.373)). 
 160 See Home Ins. Co. v. Morse, 87 U.S. 445, 445–46 (1874). 
 161 Id. at 446. 
 162 Id. at 446–47. 
 
7 GEORGE (DO NOT DELETE) 6/18/2019  11:19 AM 
296 BAYLOR LAW REVIEW [Vol. 71:2 
   
 
Wisconsin supreme court affirmed.163 The United States Supreme Court used 
a thorough explanation of English and American ouster theory to invalidate 
Home Insurance’s waiver of removal rights,164 and further found the 
Wisconsin statute unconstitutional in obstructing defendant’s right to federal 
court in a diversity case.165 
Following Morse, the Supreme Court ruled the opposite in two cases and 
set up a precedent split that was not resolved until 1922. The first case, two 
years after Morse and involving the same Wisconsin statute, was Doyle v. 
Continental Insurance Company.166 This time, the state statute won on the 
Supreme Court’s reasoning that the defendant, a Connecticut insurer, had no 
constitutional right to do business in Wisconsin, that Wisconsin could impose 
limits on foreign insurers doing business there, and that defendant could 
choose between its right to remove a case and it’s privilege of doing business 
in Wisconsin.167 The Court was able to distinguish its Morse ruling on the 
same statute, but three justices did not buy that distinction and dissented.168 
Thirty years after Doyle, in Security Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Prewitt, the 
Supreme Court upheld a similar Kentucky statute forbidding removal rights, 
discussing Morse, Doyle and ouster.169  At this point the Supreme Court 
precedent count was one for removal and two against. That balance shifted 
with two cases in 1914 and 1916. In Harrison v. St. Louis & S.F.R. Co., the 
Supreme Court struck down an Oklahoma law imposing a removal penalty, 
and did so on constitutional grounds with no mention of ouster.170 The 
opinion also failed to mention Morse, but did distinguish Doyle’ s and 
 
 163 Id. at 447. 
 164 Id. at 451–53. 
 165 Id. at 458. In spite of the seemingly clear argument that the federally-guaranteed right of 
access to federal court pre-empted the Wisconsin prohibition of removal to federal court, two 
justices dissented on the grounds that a state had the right to deny access to foreign companies and 
could set the terms of their doing business locally. 
 166 94 U.S. 535 (1876). 
 167 Id. at 542. 
 168 Id. at 543. 
 169 202 U.S. 246, 246, 250, 254 (1906). Morse and Doyle are discussed throughout the case. 
Ouster is discussed at Id. at 250, 254. 
 170 232 U.S. 318, 333–34 (1914). 
 
7 GEORGE (DO NOT DELETE) 6/18/2019  11:19 AM 
2019] FORUM CLAUSES AT THE MARGIN 297 
   
 
Prewitt’ s upholding of removal-barring state statutes.171 Donald v. 
Philadelphia Reading Coal & Iron Co. involved yet another Wisconsin 
statute that directed secretary of state to revoke the license of any foreign 
corporation (not just insurers) who removed a state-filed case to federal 
court.172 This time, a unanimous Supreme Court ruled in a short opinion that 
the Wisconsin statute violated a constitutional right173 with no mention of 
Doyle , Morse, or the common law ouster doctrine. 
With these several cases addressing similar, if not identical, state attacks 
on removal, using distinct doctrinal approaches and reaching opposing 
results, the Supreme Court finally got on one page with Terral v. Burke 
Const. Co.in 1922.174 Terral dealt with an Arkansas statute instructing its 
secretary of state to revoke the doing-business privileges of any company that 
filed in or removed to federal court. The Supreme Court unanimously held 
the statute unconstitutional, overruled Doyle and Prewitt, and referred to 
Morse in the analysis. 
3.  Bremen and its Brethren 
Whatever your assessment of forum clause history, 1972 marked a 
change in the United States. The erroneous histories report it as a shift from 
categorical rejection of forum clauses to a reasoned acceptance,175 while 
critics see it as the start of the overly-strong presumption that led to Atlantic 
Marine.176 The accurate histories are not entirely recent, but, in spite of their 
 
 171 Id. at 332. 
 172 Donald v. Phila. Reading Coal & Iron Co., 241 U.S. 329, 331 (1916). 
 173 Id. at 333. 
 174 257 U.S. 529, 533 (1922). 
 175 See 14D Wright & Miller, supra note 70, § 3803.1 at 57; PETER HAY ET AL., CONFLICT OF 
LAWS 536, (5th ed. 2010), quoting Note 9, William E. Skye, Agreements in Advance Conferring 
Exclusive Jurisdiction on Foreign Courts, 10 LA. L. REV. 293, 293 (1949); George, supra note 72, 
at 913; Steven J. Burton, The New Judicial Hostility to Arbitration: Federal Preemption, Contract 
Unconscionability, and Agreements to Arbitrate, 2006 J. DISP. RES. 469, 473–78 (2006). 
 176 See Linda S. Mullenix, Gaming the System: Protecting Consumers from Unconscionable 
Contractual Forum-Selection and Arbitration Clauses, 66 HASTINGS L.J. 719, 754 (2015) 
[hereinafter Gaming the System]; Another Choice of Forum, supra note 153, at 314–15; Perils of 
Contract Procedure, supra note 78, passim; Elizabeth Thornburg, Designer Trials, 2006 J. Disp. 
Res. 181, passim (2006) [hereinafter Designer Trials]; Judith Resnik, Whither and Whether 
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availability, the erroneous history more often held sway in the Bremen shift 
that led to the current overly-strong presumption favoring forum clauses.177 
That shift is best understood in the language of six cases.178 
a.  The Bremen v. Zapata Offshore Company179 
Houston-based Zapata Off-Shore Company contracted with Unterweser, 
a German company, to tow Zapata’s ocean-going, self-elevating oil drilling 
rig (the Chaparral) from Louisiana to a point near Ravenna, Italy in the 
Adriatic Sea. The contract, drafted by Unterweser in bidding for the job, had 
a forum clause reading “Any dispute arising must be treated before the 
London Court of Justice.”180 A dispute did arise when Unterweser’s tug, the 
Bremen, encountered rough seas in the Gulf of Mexico and was forced to 
limp into port at Tampa, Florida. Each party claimed the other was negligent: 
Zapata claimed that the Bremen was not a seaworthy tug and that its crew 
was negligent, and Unterweser claimed that the Chaparral was not a 
seaworthy rig.181 Zapata ignored the contract’s London forum clause and 
filed an admiralty action in federal court in Tampa.182 Unterweser responded 
with an action in England, seeking to compel litigation there.183 The Tampa 
federal court denied Unterweser’s motion to enforce the forum clause and 
enjoined Unterweser from continuing in the latter-filed English action.184  
 
Adjudication? 86 BOSTON U. L. REV. 1101, passim (2006) [hereinafter Resnik]; Davis & Hershkoff, 
Contracting for Procedure, 53 WM & MARY L. REV. 507, passim (2011) [hereinafter Contracting 
for Procedure]; Solomine, supra note 152, passim. 
 177 See Ehrenzweig, supra note 78, at 145–53, esp. p. 147 (“Neither history nor rationale thus 
bear out the much-repeated general axiom that parties may not ‘oust’ the courts from their 
jurisdiction.”); see also Addison C. Burnham, Arbitration as a Condition Precedent, 11 HARV. L. 
REV. 234 (1897). 
 178 The text discussing the next five cases (all but Atlantic Marine) is drawn from George, supra 
note 72, at 913–23 and used with permission of Baylor Law Review. The text has slight changes 
and my opinion has significant changes. 
 179 The Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1 (1972). 
 180 Id. at 2. 
 181 Id. at 3–4. 
 182 Id. 
 183 Id. at 4. 
 184 Id. at 6. 
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The English court responded by denying Zapata’s motion to stay or 
dismiss that action.185 Back in the United States, the Fifth Circuit Court of 
Appeals upheld the district court’s ruling against Unterweser based on the 
ouster doctrine already adopted in the Fifth Circuit,186 and further based on 
the in rem nature of Zapata’s admiralty claim and the convenience of 
litigating in Florida near the site of the damage.187 The Fifth Circuit later 
reaffirmed its holding in a sharply-divided en banc opinion, with eight judges 
favoring the prior holding and six opposed.188 
The Supreme Court reversed, and in doing so shifted the analysis for 
forum clauses, or reversed it if you believe the ouster doctrine was the law. 
The policy underlying the change was clear, with strong references to the 
“expansion of overseas commercial activities” and the demise of the “barrier 
of distance that once tended to confine a business concern to a modest 
territory.”189 Applying this policy shift, the Court noted that the contracting 
parties were sophisticated companies from different countries, and that the 
contract was for a specific one-time service towing of “a[n] extremely costly 
piece of equipment from Louisiana across the Gulf of Mexico and the 
Atlantic Ocean, through the Mediterranean Sea to its final destination in the 
Adriatic Sea.”190 The fact that the towing would pass through many distinct 
national jurisdictions, and that a problem could have occurred at any point 
 
 185 Unterweser Reederei GMBH. v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 158 (C.A. 1968). 
 186 In re Unterweser Reederei GMBH, 428 F.2d 888, 893 (5th Cir. 1970) (“[A]greements in 
advance of controversy whose object is to oust the jurisdiction of the courts are contrary to the 
public policy and will not be enforced.” (quoting Carbon Black Export, Inc. v. The SS Monrosa, 
254 F.2d 297, 300–01 (5th Cir. 1958))). 
 187 Unterweser, 428 F.2d at 894. 
 188 In re Unterweser Reederei, GMBH, 446 F.2d 907, 908 (5th Cir. 1971), vacated sub nom; 
M/S Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1 (1972). 
 189 Bremen, 407 U.S. at 8. The Court continued: 
The expansion of American business and industry will hardly be encouraged if, notwithstanding 
solemn contracts, we insist on a parochial concept that all disputes must be resolved under our laws 
and in our courts. . . . We cannot have trade and commerce in world markets and international waters 
exclusively on our terms, governed by our laws, and resolved in our courts. 
Id. at 9. 
 190 Id. at 13. 
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along the way, justified the honoring of their contracting for a neutral 
forum.191 The Court then generalized the new rule: 
[I]n the light of present-day commercial realities and 
expanding international trade we conclude that the forum 
clause should control absent a strong showing that it should 
be set aside. . . . [I]t seems reasonably clear that the District 
Court and the Court of Appeals placed the burden on 
Unterweser to show that London would be a more 
convenient forum than Tampa, although the contract 
expressly resolved that issue. The correct approach would 
have been to enforce the forum clause specifically unless 
Zapata could clearly show that enforcement would be 
unreasonable and unjust, or that the clause was invalid for 
such reasons as fraud or overreaching.192 
Bremen also addressed a concern that in some cases, the enforcement of 
a forum clause would subject a local party to an unfriendly forum or unfair 
law; the Court thus held that a forum clause should be held unenforceable if 
enforcement would contravene a strong public policy of the forum in which 
suit is brought, whether declared by statute or by judicial decision.193 Having 
stated this, the Court embraced the dissenters’ view from the Bremen 
appellate opinion, finding that the enforcement of the clause in Bremen did 
not violate public policy because the conduct occurred outside United States 
territory, and that “we should not invalidate the forum clause here unless we 
are firmly convinced that we would thereby significantly encourage negligent 
conduct within the boundaries of the United States.”194  
 
 191 “It cannot be doubted for a moment that the parties sought to provide for a neutral forum for 
the resolution of any disputes arising during the tow. Manifestly much uncertainty and possibly 
great inconvenience to both parties could arise if a suit could be maintained in any jurisdiction in 
which an accident might occur or if jurisdiction were left to any place where the Bremen or 
Unterweser might happen to be found. The elimination of all such uncertainties by agreeing in 
advance on a forum acceptable to both parties is an indispensable element in international trade, 
commerce, and contracting.” Id. at 13–14 (footnote omitted). 
 192 Id. at 15. 
 193 Id. at 15 (citing Boyd v. Grand Trunk W.R. Co., 338 U.S. 263 (1949)). 
 194 Id. at 16 (quoting In re Unterweser Reederei GMBH, 428 F.2d 888, 907–08 (5th Cir. 1970)). 
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The Court further held that an “unreasonable” forum clause is 
unenforceable, but limited unreasonableness to situations where the chosen 
forum was “seriously inconvenient.”195 The Court placed the burden for 
establishing unreasonableness on the party challenging the clause, noting that 
“it should be incumbent on the party seeking to escape his contract to show 
that trial in the contractual forum will be so gravely difficult and inconvenient 
that he will for all practical purposes be deprived of his day in court.”196 This 
language is the start of what is now the Atlantic Marine presumption, and it 
seemed reasonable in this context.197 
b.  Scherk v. Alberto-Culver198 
Arbitration clauses were the next step in expanding forum clauses, 
occurring with two federal statutory claims for which Congress had 
precluded binding arbitration. The crucial factor was the presence of foreign 
parties and the choice of a foreign forum, which a slim majority of the Court 
thought sufficient to override the policy of barring arbitration agreements in 
federal securities cases. Arbitration clauses matter in forum-clause analysis 
because courts have tended to mix the precedents from arbitration rulings 
with other categories.199 Bremen is one example.200 In Scherk, the Court 
considered whether the parties’ freely-negotiated arbitration clause, 
designating the International Chamber of Commerce in Paris, should be 
enforced against a domestic corporation’s wish to litigate its securities fraud 
claim in the United States.201 The case arose from Illinois-based Alberto-
Culver’s expansion into the European market. One of its initial moves was to 
contract with German businessman Fritz Scherk to acquire his rights to three 
interrelated business entities organized under German and Liechtenstein law. 
 
 195 Id. at 16. 
 196 Id. at 18. 
 197 Atl. Marine Constr. Co. v. U.S. Dist. Court, 571 U.S. 49, 59–60 (2013) (quoting Stewart 
Org., Inc. v. Ricoh Corp., 487 U.S. 22, 33 (1988)). 
 198 417 U.S. 506 (1974). 
 199 See 14D Wright & Miller, supra note 70, § 3803.1, at 59, esp. note 11. See also Kelvin 
Engineering Co. v. Blanco, 210 N.Y.S. 10, 13 (1925) (forum clause pointing to litigation in 
Santiago, Chile approved under New York arbitration law). 
 200 See 407 U.S. at 13–14, nn. 15 & 16. 
 201 417 U.S. at 508. 
 
7 GEORGE (DO NOT DELETE) 6/18/2019  11:19 AM 
302 BAYLOR LAW REVIEW [Vol. 71:2 
   
 
Scherk’s express warranty that he was conveying “the sole and 
unencumbered ownership of these trademarks” was overstated and Alberto-
Culver sued for securities fraud in federal court in Illinois. Scherk sought to 
enforce the contract’s arbitration clause, but the lower courts denied Scherk’s 
motion, drawing from the holding in Wilko v. Swan that actions under the 
Securities Act of 1933 were exempt from arbitration clauses. This in turn was 
based on statutory language in the 1933 Act that barred “[a] condition, 
stipulation, or provision binding any person acquiring any security to waive 
compliance with any provision of this subchapter.”202 The Wilko opinion 
noted the policy clash between this language and the policies underlying the 
United States Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. §§ 1 et seq. As recounted in Scherk: 
The [Wilko] Court found that ‘[t]wo policies, not easily 
reconcilable, are involved in this case.’ On the one hand, the 
Arbitration Act stressed ‘the need for avoiding the delay and 
expense of litigation,’ and directed that such agreements be 
‘valid, irrevocable, and enforceable’ in federal courts. On the 
other hand, the Securities Act of 1933 was ‘[d]esigned to 
make full and fair disclosure of the character of securities 
sold in interstate and foreign commerce and to prevent fraud 
in their sale,’ by creating ‘a special right to recover for 
misrepresentation . . . .’203 
While Wilko struck this balance in favor of litigation of securities fraud 
claims and the non-enforcement of arbitration clauses, Scherk did the 
opposite, finding that the strong international flavor of Scherk’s facts called 
into play policy interests that dictated an opposite result from Wilko. Scherk 
also noted that neither an arbitration clause nor any other forum clause could 
be defeated by allegations of securities fraud (or presumably any other fraud). 
That is, a mere allegation of fraud did not negate the contract containing the 
choice of forum agreement. However, the forum clause could be defeated by 
showing the “inclusion of that clause in the contract was the product of fraud 
or coercion.”204 Notably, this is the expansion of Bremen’s point that fraud is 
 
 202 Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427 (1953), overruled by Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/Am. 
Exp., Inc., 490 U.S. 477 (1989). 
 203 Scherk, 417 U.S. at 512 (quoting Wilko, 346 U.S. at 431, 438). 
 204 Id. at 519, n.14 (emphasis original). 
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grounds to set aside the clause, to one that the fraud must go to the forum 
clause rather than the contract as a whole.205  
There was significant dissent in Scherk. While Bremen’s enforcement of 
a forum clause was an 8-1 decision, Scherk’s enforcement of a foreign 
arbitration agreement was a 5-4 vote, owing to concerns about federal 
securities policy rather than the distinction between adjudication and 
arbitration. The four dissenters would have enforced the arbitration clause 
had it been a mere trademark dispute, but argued that the Congressional 
policy underlying securities fraud claims compelled support for the plaintiff’s 
choice of a federal judicial forum, and that the majority’s “invocation of the 
‘international contract’ talisman” was insufficient to override that policy.206  
c.  Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc.207 
Eleven years after Scherk, the Court had another close vote along similar 
lines, this time with antitrust as the non-arbitral federal right. In Mitsubishi, 
the Court held by a 5-3 vote that, in international cases, unlike domestic ones, 
the federal policy favoring enforcement of arbitration clauses prevailed over 
a conflicting federal policy that made antitrust claims non-arbitrable. The 
case arose from a dispute between car maker Mitsubishi (a joint venture of 
Chrysler International, a Swiss corporation, and Mitsubishi Heavy Industries, 
a Japanese corporation) and Soler, a Puerto Rican corporation located in 
Pueblo Viejo, Puerto Rico. Two years into the parties’ distributorship 
agreement, Soler’s sales declined and it sought to delay or cancel some 
shipments, and “transship” other cars to be sold in the continental United 
States and Latin America. Mitsubishi refused. When attempts to resolve the 
dispute failed, it sued in federal court in Puerto Rico, seeking to compel 
arbitration under the terms of the distributorship agreement. Solar objected 
 
 205 In Bremen, the Court stated that forum clauses (at least in transnational admiralty settings), 
should be enforced unless the derogating party could show that enforcement “would be 
unreasonable and unjust, or that the clause was invalid for such reasons as fraud or overreaching.” 
407 U.S. at 15. By enforcing a forum clause in a fraud claim, Scherk narrowed the fraud defense to 
the clause itself, at least implying that evidence of contractual fraud as a whole is irrelevant to forum 
clause enforcement. 417 U.S. at 518. 
 206 Scherk, 417 U.S. at 529 (Douglas, J. dissenting, joined by Brennan, White and Marshall). 
 207 473 U.S. 614 (1985). 
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to arbitration and counterclaimed for violations of the Sherman Antitrust 
Act208 and the related Automobile Dealers’ Day in Court Act.209 The district 
court ordered arbitration of all claims. The First Circuit reversed as to the 
antitrust claims, following Am. Safety Equip. Corp. v. J.P. Maguire & Co.,210 
which had held that antitrust claims were non-arbitrable.  
The Supreme Court reversed, focusing narrowly on the arbitrability of an 
antitrust claim arising in an international agreement. Recognizing that not all 
controversies “implicating statutory rights are suitable for arbitration,”211 the 
Court nonetheless found that the concerns raised in American Safety were 
insufficient in international cases to overcome the federal presumption 
favoring arbitration clauses. The majority further noted that where foreign 
arbitration did not, in hindsight, protect antitrust concerns, that the problem 
could be addressed at the award-enforcement stage (although this assumes 
that the award would be enforced in a United States court): 
As in Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., we conclude that 
concerns of international comity, respect for the capacities 
of foreign and transnational tribunals, and sensitivity to the 
need of the international commercial system for 
predictability in the resolution of disputes require that we 
enforce the parties’ agreement, even assuming that a 
contrary result would be forthcoming in a domestic 
context.212 
In a lengthy dissent, Justices Stevens, Brennan and Marshall contested 
the concept that “vague notions of international comity” compelled a 
different treatment for international disputes than for local ones regarding 
antitrust claims. The dissent derided the majority’s “repeated incantation of 
the high ideals of ‘international arbitration’ [that] creates the impression that 
this case involves the fate of an institution designed to implement a formula 
for world peace.”213 
 
 208 15 U.S.C. §§ 1–38 (2012). See Mitsubishi, 473 U.S. at 618. 
 209 15 U.S.C. §§ 1221–26. (2012). See Mitsubishi, 473 U.S. at 618. 
 210 Am. Safety Equip. Corp. v. J.P. Maguire & Co., 391 F.2d 821, 828 (2d Cir. 1968). 
 211 Mitsubishi, 473 U.S. at 627. 
 212 Id. at 629 (citation omitted). 
 213 Id. at 665. 
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d.  Stewart Organization, Inc. v. Ricoh Corporation214  
In 1988, after the steady doctrinal shift favoring forum clauses, the Court 
hit a bump when considering forum clauses’ effect in diversity cases, where 
Erie arguably required state law control over the contract issues. New Jersey-
based Ricoh Corporation had a dealership agreement with Stewart 
Organization, a closely-held Alabama corporation, containing a forum clause 
providing that “the courts in New York City, the borough of Manhattan, 
would have ‘exclusive jurisdiction over any case or controversy arising under 
or in connection with this Agreement and shall be a proper forum in which 
to adjudicate such case or controversy.’”215 In 1984, Stewart sued in federal 
court in Alabama for breach of contract and related claims, as well as antitrust 
claims.216 Invoking the forum clause, Ricoh moved for a § 1404(a) transfer 
to the Southern District of New York.217 The federal district court denied the 
motion on the grounds that this was an issue of contract law and thus 
controlled, under the Erie Doctrine, by Alabama law which disfavored forum 
clauses.218 
The Eleventh Circuit reversed.219 It agreed that the Erie Doctrine applied, 
but determined that the issue was one of venue, not contract, and that for 
venue issues the Erie analysis favored federal law.220 In doing so, the 
appellate court obviously believed that § 1404(a) did not apply, and in the 
absence of federal law on point, the Eleventh Circuit applied the federal 
common law found in Bremen.221 
The Supreme Court affirmed, but on different grounds under the Erie 
Doctrine, setting the stage for a circuit split on what law governs forum 
clauses in federal courts.222 The Court agreed with the Eleventh Circuit that 
 
 214 487 U.S. 22 (1988). 
 215 Stewart Org., Inc. v. Ricoh Corp., 810 F.2d 1066, 1067 (11th Cir. 1987), aff’d and remanded, 
487 U.S. 22 (1988). 
 216 Id. at 1067 
 217 Id. 
 218 Id. 
 219 Id. At 1071. 
 220 Id. at 1067-1068 
 221 Id. at 1069 
 222 Stewart, 487 U.S. at 25–27. 
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this was a venue issue, but noted that there was a federal statute on point—
§ 1404(a). The Erie Doctrine flows from the Rules of Decision Act, which 
provides that state law is the rule of decision in federal courts, “except where 
the Constitution or treaties of the United States or Act of Congress otherwise 
require or provide . . . .”223 In this case, Congress has otherwise provided by 
enacting § 1404(a), which the Court found on point.224 In doing so, the Court 
took care to highlight the difference between the Eleventh Circuit’s analysis 
under Bremen and its own under § 1404(a). Bremen enforces the parties’ 
forum clause as a contractual obligation, with comity as an additional 
consideration. Section 1404(a) does not automatically enforce the forum 
clause, but uses it as a trigger for a 1404(a) analysis, in which the parties’ 
expectation is an element, along with convenience and economy, and “those 
public-interest factors of systematic integrity and fairness under the heading 
of ‘the interest of justice.’”225 All this is to be done in an “individualized, 
case-by-case consideration of convenience and fairness.”226 
e.  Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc. v. Shute227 
No doubt the most controversial, Carnival Cruise is also the most 
factually succinct of the cases. It was a straightforward slip and fall claim that 
led to the expanded enforcement of forum clauses from Bremen’s “freely 
negotiated agreement” standard to one honoring even fine print clauses in 
adhesion contracts. Carnival is the reason that most of us have now 
unwillingly agreed to litigate or arbitrate in a faraway place. 
The case began with the Shutes’ purchase of tickets through a local 
Seattle travel agency for a Pacific cruise departing from Los Angeles. Among 
other fine print in the three attached pages, the ticket had a clause requiring 
that all related suits be litigated in Florida. Mrs. Shute was injured in a fall 
aboard ship off the west coast of Mexico, allegedly caused by Carnival’s 
negligence. As Professor Mullenix explained in her contemporaneous article, 
the resulting five years of non-merits litigation “belie[d] the purported utility 
 
 223 28 U.S.C. § 1652 (2012). 
 224 Stewart, 487 U.S. at 29–32. 
 225 Id. at 27–30. 
 226 Id. at 29 (quoting Van Dusen v. Barrak, 376 U.S. 612, 622 (1964)). 
 227 499 U.S. 585 (1991). 
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of forum-selection clauses.”228 Briefly recounted, the Shutes sued Carnival 
in federal court in Washington. Carnival moved for summary judgment on 
two grounds, amenability and the mandatory Florida forum clause. The 
district court granted the summary judgment only on personal jurisdiction 
grounds and dismissed the case. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed 
on jurisdiction and further rejected Carnival’s attempt to enforce the forum 
clause, finding that it was not freely negotiated and that the Shutes were 
physically and financially incapable of pursuing the litigation in Florida.229 
At this point the Court of Appeals delayed its opinion to submit a certified 
question to the Washington Supreme Court, asking its view on the 
Washington long arm statute’s reach. The Washington Supreme Court found 
the long arm embraced Carnival’s local activities, and with that the Court of 
Appeals issued its opinion establishing personal jurisdiction and rejecting the 
boilerplate forum clause.  
Professor Mullenix points out that at this point, the litigation was about 
personal jurisdiction. That view is further supported in Carnival’s appeal to 
the United States Supreme Court, in which both parties’ briefs focused 
primarily on personal jurisdiction. The Court never reached that question and 
instead switched to the enforceability of the ticket’s fine-print, the boilerplate 
forum clause which required “that all disputes and matters whatsoever arising 
under, in connection with or incident to this Contract shall be litigated, if at 
all, in and before a Court located in the State of Florida, U.S.A., to the 
exclusion of the Courts of any other state or country.”230  
Up to then, a pre-printed forum clause would not have been considered 
because it fit none of the Bremen guidelines. It was not negotiated, the 
parties’ bargaining power was uneven, it did not involve an international 
claim or foreign parties (except that Florida-based Carnival was incorporated 
in Panama), and it did not reflect the needs of international commerce. 
Nonetheless the Court’s majority found the clause reasonable based on 
Carnival’s interest in avoiding litigation in various locales where its ships sail 
(even though this forum was the site of the ticket sale), sparing litigants and 
 
 228 See Linda S. Mullenix, Another Easy Case, Some More Bad Law: Carnival Cruise Lines and 
Contractual Personal Jurisdiction, 27 TEX. INT’L L. J. 323, 332 (1992). 
 229 Carnival, 499 U.S. at 589. 
 230 Id. at 587–88. 
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judges the time and expense of forum fights, and optimizing the passenger 
benefit in lower litigation costs.231 In spite of considerable criticism of its 
questionable economic analysis, Carnival Cruise took the forum-clause 
presumption to new extremes by holding that adhesion contracts could limit 
litigation to distant forums in spite of the relative burden on consumer 
plaintiffs. 
f.  Atlantic Marine 
Atlantic Marine Construction Company is incorporated and based in 
Virginia, and does construction work “from Virginia to California” according 
to its website.232 In 2009, it contacted with the United States Army Corps of 
Engineers to build a child-development center at Fort Hood, Texas, and 
pertinent to that, it entered a subcontract with J-Crew Management Inc., for 
certain work on the project.233 Their contract had a forum clause requiring 
that disputes between the parties “shall be litigated in the Circuit Court for 
the City of Norfolk, Virginia, or the United States District Court for the 
Eastern District of Virginia, Norfolk Division.”234 When a payment dispute 
occurred, J-Crew ignored the forum clause and filed a federal diversity claim 
against Atlantic Marine in the Western District of Texas.235  
Although J-Crew had filed in the district where the dispute arose, Atlantic 
Marine moved to dismiss for wrong venue (arguing that the forum clause 
invalidated venue anywhere but the parties’ chosen forum),236 and 
alternatively for inconvenient-forum transfer. The district court denied both 
motions, holding that venue was not at issue, that § 1404 was the exclusive 
remedy for enforcing forum clauses pointing to another federal forum, and 
that Atlantic Marine had not meet its burden of showing the Texas forum 
inconvenient for a local matter. Atlantic Marine petitioned for a writ of 
 
 231 See id. at 593–94. The Court also found no evidence of lack of fundamental fairness such as 
bad faith, fraud, overreaching or lack of notice. See id. at 595. 
 232 Atlantic Marine Construction Company Inc., http://www.amccinc.com/about.html (last 
visited on August 7, 2017). 
 233 See Atl. Marine Constr. Co., Inc. v. U.S. Dist. Court, 571 U.S. 49, 52–53 (2013). 
 234 Id. at 53. 
 235 Id. 
 236 Atlantic Marine’s argument was based on 28 U.S.C. § 1406(a) and Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(3). 
Id. at 55. 
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mandamus, and lost again when the United States Court of Appeals for Fifth 
Circuit denied the writ because Atlantic Marine failed to show “a clear and 
indisputable” right to relief. The appellate court also affirmed the trial court 
as to § 1404 being the exclusive remedy for enforcing a forum clause 
designating another federal forum, and noted in dictum that if the 
contractually-designated forum was not a United States federal court, then 
the remedy is Rule 12(b)(3) to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction. A 
concurring opinion disagreed on the lack of a venue remedy and urged 
Atlantic Marine to seek Supreme Court view, which it did. 
In its unanimous reversal, the Supreme Court aligned with none of the 
parties’ arguments or lower judges’ conclusions. The Court disagreed with 
Atlantic Marine and the concurring judge on venue as a remedy, and thus 
affirmed the Fifth Circuit majority on the remedy as exclusively one of 
inconvenient forum,237 but reversed the outcome and in doing so, clarified 
several important points for forum clause practice. In particular, the Court 
agreed with the appellate majority that the venue statute and procedural rule 
do not apply and that 28 U.S.C. § 1404 is the only remedy for enforcing a 
forum clause involving federal forums. The Court took pains to explain that 
the venue laws allow for dismissal only when venue is “wrong” or 
“improper” as spelled out in those laws. Whether venue is “wrong” or 
“improper” depends exclusively on federal venue statutes,238 and a forum 
clause “has no bearing on whether a case falls into one of the specified 
districts.”239 
In resolving the remedy category—wrong venue versus chosen venue—
the court briefly commented on two related points that were not present here. 
First, this was an intra-federal contest. The ruling briefly instructed that 1404 
applied under these modified guidelines did not apply to cases involving a 
non-federal court. Thus, forum clauses pointing to a jurisdiction other than 
another federal district (that is, a state or foreign court) are enforced through 
 
 237 Id. at 55–61. 
 238 The Court explained that 28 U.S.C. § 1391 is the general venue statute and it governs unless 
there’s a more specific venue statute. “[If] a case falls within one of [§ 1391(b)’s districts]. . . . 
[V]enue is proper; if it does not, venue is improper, and the case must be dismissed or transferred 
under § 1406(a).” Id. at 56. 
 239 Id. at 56 (relying on Van Dusen v. Barrack, 376 U. S. 612 (1964) and Stewart Org. Inc., v. 
Ricoh Corp., 487 U.S. 22 (1988)). See id. at 56–59. 
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the common law doctrine of forum non conveniens. The Court noted that 
“1404(a) is a codification of that [common law] doctrine for the subset of 
cases in which the transferee forum is another federal court.”240 Second, the 
Court noted but declined to consider an alternative remedy that Atlantic 
Marine failed to raise: in a contract action (which this was) involving a 
derogating forum clause (which this did), could defendant move to dismiss 
under Rule 12(b)(6) (which Atlantic Marine did not do). Atlantic Marine had 
not raised this point, and the Court declined because it wasn’t argued or 
briefed other than by amicus.241   
Having disposed of the venue arguments, the Court moved on to explain 
Atlantic Marine’s § 1404 remedy. Because this forum contest involved two 
federal districts in the United State, that remedy is the federal inconvenient 
forum statute— 28 U.S.C. § 1404 —and its judicially-created balancing test 
minus the private convenience factors which are subsumed in the parties’ 
forum agreement.242 Further clarifying, the Court emphasized three analytical 
points about derogating forum clauses in an intra-federal setting:  
• Plaintiff’s choice of forum is not presumptively valid, 
and instead plaintiff bears the burden of proving that 
defendant’s requested transfer to the contractually-
chosen forum is unjustified under the 1404 public 
factors test as modified in Atlantic Marine.243 
• The 1404 balancing test is modified to discard the 
private convenience factors (which the Court held were 
 
 240 Id. at 60 (citing Sinochem Int’l Co. v. Malaysia Int’l Shipping Corp., 549 U.S. 422, 430 
(2007)). 
 241 See Brief of Professor Stephen E. Sachs as Amicus Curiae in Support of Neither Party, Atl. 
Marine Constr. Co., Inc. v. U.S. Dist. Court, 571 U.S. 49 (2013) (No. 12-929), 2013 WL 3362094. 
 242 See Atl. Marine, 571 U.S. at 62–68. The omitted private interest factors include “relative 
ease of access to sources of proof; availability of compulsory process for attendance of unwilling, 
and the cost of obtaining attendance of willing, witnesses; possibility of view of premises, if view 
would be appropriate to the action; and all other practical problems that make trial of a case easy, 
expeditious and inexpensive.” Id. at 62 n. 6 (quoting Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235, 241 
n. 6 (1981)). 
 243 See id. at 63–64. 
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conceded in the forum clause), leaving only the public 
factors as the test for enforcement.244  
• The transfer to the contractually-chosen forum does not 
include the transferor forum’s choice of law rules, 
contrary to Van Dusen v. Barrack, such that the 
transferee forum’s law will determine the governing 
law.245 
Applying the revised test, the Court found that the court of appeals 
improperly placed the burden on Atlantic Marine to prove that transfer to the 
parties’ contractually-chosen forum was appropriate instead of requiring that 
J-Crew, the derogating party, show that public-interest factors 
overwhelmingly disfavored a transfer. The appellate court also erred in 
giving weight to the parties’ private interests outside those expressed in the 
forum clause, and finally, the appellate court’s holding that public interests 
favored keeping the case in Texas because Texas contract law is more 
familiar to federal judges in Texas than those in Virginia rested in part on the 
District Court’s mistaken belief that the Virginia federal court would have 
been required to apply Texas’ choice-of-law rules instead of Virginia’s. The 
Court also disagreed with the appellate court’s view that Virginia judges 
weren’t capable of applying Texas law. 
C.  Post-Bremen Analytics 
The current canon for forum clauses, at least in federal practice, is built 
on a distorted history. A post hoc question arises here—the Bremen / Atlantic 
Marine formula is based on a misstated legal history, but is that erroneous 
history the cause of the extreme formula? That is, the Court could have 
reached the same conclusion with a proper historical assessment. But in a 
common law system based on stare decisis, changes are often conceived as 
calculated pendulum swings, and a miscalculation of the pendulum’s 
beginning point necessarily affects the validity of its end point. In the forum-
clause swing, the Supreme Court perceived the pendulum as far to one side 
and attempted to move it to the middle. In fact, the pendulum was much 
closer to the middle and the move shifted it to an extreme.   
 
 244 See id. at 64. 
 245 See id. at 64–66 (deviating from Van Dusen v. Barrack, 376 U.S. 612 (1964)). 
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Even though a proper account shows a tempered view of forum clauses 
(even if some courts routinely rejected them), the official-but-erred narrative 
was an unreasonable categorical rejection of forum clauses being replaced by 
a reasoned acceptance.246 The true history was mixed, with reasonably clear 
lines of approval in English law and erratic approval in the United States 
where state and federal courts readily mixed case categories. This began to 
change in 1972 when Bremen directed that forum clauses in admiralty 
disputes be presumptively valid and enforceable. The fact that a prima facie 
contract is presumptively enforceable is unremarkable in itself but the Court 
has continually upped the burden. The presumption was expanded to 
international arbitration with Scherk and Mitsubishi, not only approving 
arbitration clauses but also overcoming federal statutes barring their use in 
securities and antitrust cases. Stewart enlarged forum-clause approval to 
diversity cases (one involving a choice of state court) which thwarted 
plaintiff’s Article III right to federal court. Atlantic Marine clarified the use 
of the inconvenient-venue test over wrong-venue remedies and raised the 
derogating plaintiff’s burden in avoiding the forum clause.  
The Bremen sextet is limited to federal courts, because the rulings are 
phrased in terms of venue transfers or dismissals.247 More specifically, the 
Bremen series deals with forum-clause enforcement in federal courts whose 
jurisdiction was invoked in derogation of a mandatory forum clause.248 In 
spite of this limit to federal practice, Bremen’s influence has either ushered 
or mirrored similar expansion in state courts.249  
Understanding the courts’ analytical process requires a look at the myriad 
of related issues briefly explained in the introduction. First, is the clause 
permissive, merely consenting to jurisdiction, or mandatory, designating an 
exclusive forum? Second, is the clause prorogating, supporting the plaintiff’s 
filing, or derogating, attacking plaintiff’s chosen forum? Third, what is the 
 
 246 See M/S Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1, 15–18 (1972). 
 247 See Atl. Marine, 571 U.S. at 59–60. 
 248 Permissive forum clauses consent to jurisdiction but do not limit it, and thus do not trigger a 
Bremen analysis. See supra note 12. 
 249 See 14D Wright & Miller, supra note 70, § 3803.1, esp. note 102 and accompanying text; 
Born & Rutledge, supra note 72, at 442–43 (outlining varying approaches in different jurisdictions 
in the United States but noting the predominant favor shown to forum clauses in international 
commercial cases). 
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relationship between the contractually chosen forum and plaintiff’s choice 
for filing the case? Is it intrafederal, state-federal, interstate, state-foreign, or 
federal-foreign? The permutations for these three categories can require 
differing analyses and often produce different results.250 Courts and 
commentators have come up with a number of analytical frameworks which 
differ not only on the answers but also on the questions posed and the steps 
in the analysis.251 From these various approaches, a number of thorny issues 
have emerged, starting with the analytical approach to be used. Is forum 
clause approval a matter of public venue law or private contract?252 If the 
 
 250 For example, if the forum clause is permissive and designates Texas, and if plaintiff files in 
Texas, then it’s a prorogating permissive clause. If defendant objects to Texas jurisdiction, the 
question is whether the forum clause is consent under Texas law. On the other hand, if the forum 
clause names New York as the exclusive forum and plaintiff files in Texas, then the clause is a 
derogating mandatory clause. If defendant objects, the Texas court will have to decide if the clause 
is valid, applicable and enforceable—all complex questions. For a discussion of these permutations,  
see 14D Wright & Miller, supra note 70, § 3803.1, esp. at 56–57 and 107–33; Parallel Litigation, 
supra note 72, at 912–42. 
 251 The Supreme Court’s failure to address this may be the most common criticism. See e.g. 
Gaming the System, supra note 176, at 731 (identifying three questions: what governing law, 
decided by which court, and when—at the outset of a more complicated inquiry); Governing Law, 
supra note 155, passim (identifying the key issues as interpretation and enforceability and proposing 
the chosen law for interpretation and the derogating forum’s law for enforceability); Steinman, 
supra note 154, passim (endorsing federal court’s use of state law at least in diversity cases); Five 
Questions, supra note 153, at 766 (discussing the use of state law); Yackee, supra note 73, passim 
(criticizing the overuse of the derogating forum’s law, id. at 67, and proposing greater deference to 
the parties’ chosen law, passim, and for contracts lacking a choice of law clause, imputing a default 
choice of the designated forum’s law, id. at 90–91); Forum Selection Defense, supra note 150, at 
1–2 (arguing that contract law should be subordinated to the derogating forum’s procedural law); 
William J. Woodward, Jr., Constraining Opt-Outs: Shielding Local Law and Those It Protects from 
Adhesive Choice of Law Clauses, 40 LOY. L. A. L. Rev. 9, 17 (2006) (describing a three step 
contractually-based approach) (hereinafter Woodward). 
 252 Commentators have engaged in more thorough discussions of the public versus private 
function in contracting for dispute resolution. See Perils of Contract Procedure, supra note 78 at 
984 (“contractual default rules and procedural doctrine do not share the same source of legitimacy”); 
Resnik, supra note 176; Designer Trials, supra note 176; Yackee, supra note 73, at 47–62. 
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issue is contract, what distinctions must be made between interpretation and 
construction?253  
Moving beyond the threshold issue of characterizing the inquiry, what 
makes for a valid forum clause? That is, if a valid clause triggers 
enforcement, what does it look like?254 The question of validity could stand 
alone as a forum procedure question, but approached differently can be a 
perplexing choice of law question—what law governs the contract? Should 
the contract’s governing law also govern the venue or jurisdiction question? 
If so, what law? 
Just so this issue isn’t too easily resolved, there’s an interesting a priori 
problem with which comes first, clause validation or choosing the law to 
govern validation.255 These issues all go to clause validity and interpretation 
and we still haven’t reached the essential question of clause enforcement. 
Even if the validity question should be characterized as one of contract, is 
that also true for enforcement or is that a jurisdiction/venue question under 
forum law.  
In federal courts, diversity cases raise the Erie issue: Does federalism 
require the court to turn to the local state’s law on forum clauses?256 Until 
 
 253 See Governing Law, supra note 155, at 647 n. 7 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF 
CONFLICT OF LAWS, § 204 cmt. a (AM. LAW INST. 1971)) (distinguishing interpretation and 
construction); Id. at 654 n. 39. 
 254 The Atlantic Marine opinion refers twelve times to the need for a valid forum clause, see Atl. 
Marine Const. Co. v. U.S. Dist. Court for W. DIst. Of Texas, 571 U.S. 49 (2013), passim, but merely 
assumed its existence in a footnote with no guidance on validity. See 571 U.S. at 62, n. 5, (“Our 
analysis presupposes a contractually valid forum-selection clause.”) Professor Sachs notes the 
paradox of the Supreme Court’s virtually automatic enforcement of “valid” forum clauses without 
defining validity or the law governing its determination. See Five Questions, supra note 153 at 766. 
See also Gaming the System, supra note 176, at 732–33. 
 255 Unlike the rhetorical meaning of a priori, see B. Russell, “A Priori Justification and 
Knowledge,” The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Summer 2017 Edition), Edward N. Zalta 
(ed.), <https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2017/entries/apriori/>, the choice-of-law decision 
with forum clauses is not inherently deducible. For that reason, it’s more aptly described as the 
chicken-and-egg question, coined by Judge Anderson in Beilfus v. Huffy Corp. 685 N.W.2d 373, 
376 (Wis. Ct. App. 2004). See also Governing Law, supra note 155, at 644, 651–52; Gaming the 
System, supra note 176, at 730. In spite of the problem’s inherent non-deducibility, courts routinely 
lay the egg without a chicken. 
 256 In Stewart, the majority avoided this question by deciding that 28 U.S.C. § 1404 governed 
in diversity cases, and that as part of the 1404 analysis the court could decide how much weight to 
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Atlantic Marine, the question was also open whether federalism directed 
local state law for clause enforcement in diversity cases.  The Court’s answer 
is no, so that’s at least one choice of law question resolved for forum clauses 
in diversity cases.257 
Taken together, these factors mean that choosing the governing law is 
difficult.258 Courts and scholars disagree on the approach259 and in assessing 
various approaches, sometimes misreport the results.260 More telling than the 
disagreement and misreporting, there is a historic failure to address the 
choice-of-law issue.261 
Because of this complexity, forum clauses raise issues that deserve better 
than summary analysis. Even so, in Atlantic Marine the Court continued in 
the direction of simple resolution with an extreme formula: a purported 
mandatory forum clause is deemed valid and must be enforced unless the 
derogating plaintiff demonstrates extraordinary circumstances, which cannot 
include plaintiff’s inability to defend in the contractual forum. This 
 
give the parties forum clause. See Stewart Org., Inc. v. Ricoh Corp., 487 U.S. 22, 28 (1988). Justice 
Scalia dissented that this approach ignored the incumbent Erie question of the local state law’s 
position on forum clauses. See id. at 33–41 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 257 Federal common law, specifically the public/private factors test in Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 
330 U.S. 501, 508–09 (1947) imposed on the transfer authority in 28 U.S.C. § 1404, controls forum 
clause enforcement in federal diversity cases. See Atl. Marine, 571 U.S. at 59–61 (explaining the 
Court’s prior holding in Stewart). 
 258 See Gaming the System, supra note 176, at 727–36; Five Questions, supra note 153 at 766. 
But see Governing Law, supra note 155, passim (arguing that the question is not difficult if Professor 
Clermont’s proposal is followed). 
 259 See Gaming the System, supra note 176, at 756 (criticizes the overuse of contract law instead 
of forum procedural law in consumer cases); Solomine, supra note 152 at 69–85 (praises party 
autonomy and proposes treating forum clauses like any other contract); Steinman, supra note 154 
(promotes the Erie-designated contract law for validity and enforcement); Governing Law, supra 
note 155 (arguing that interpretation should be governed by the parties choice of law clause, or if 
none, the law selected by the forum’s choice of law rule, and that enforcement be governed by forum 
law); Woodward, supra note 251 (proposes a three-step analysis using conflicts principles and 
contract law); Yackee, supra note 73, at 62–76 (argues alternatively for the use of conflict of laws 
principles to guide both validity and enforcement, and for the parties’ chosen law to govern). 
 260 See Governing Law, supra note 155, at 652 n. 22. 
 261 See Five Questions, supra note 153, at 766 (“So far, the Court has decided plenty of forum-
selection cases without identifying any governing law.”) See also Governing Law, supra note 155 
at 649; Yackee, supra note 73, at 67. 
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presumption is extreme not only in its language but in its encouragement of 
summary analysis that allows marginal fact settings to breeze through.  
III.  ATLANTIC MARINE AT THE MARGIN: A CASE STUDY 
Criticism is commonly aimed at forum clauses in adhesion contracts,262 
but negotiated contracts also provide examples of Atlantic Marine’s extreme 
presumption, leading to questionable summary enforcement. The Fifth 
Circuit Court of Appeals recently offered an example. The following 
discussion is split into an explanation of the case’s trial and appellate 
opinions and a distinct critical assessment, with a few redundancies that I 
thought necessary to the analysis. 
A.  The Weber Opinion 
PACT XPP Technologies, A.G., is a German-incorporated, non-
producing entity that owns a United States patent related to highly-parallel 
processing.263 In spite of that German incorporation, PACT’s focus was the 
United States.264 As the magistrate judge found, “PACT is a German 
corporation with its principal business being the licensing and enforcement 
of its U.S. patents in this country.”265 The appellate opinion echoed this by 
noting that, “The company is incorporated in Germany, but—during the 
relevant period—its primary business activities were in the United States.”266 
To pursue that business plan, PACT sought help from California resident 
Peter Weber in 2002. His agreement was to defer compensation until he made 
a profit for PACT in pursuing infringers.267 When the profit came in 2012 – 
a $ 15 million judgment from a Texas federal court – PACT immediately 
 
 262 See, e.g., CompuCredit Corp. v. Greenwood, 565 U.S. 95, 110 (2012) (Ginsburg, J. 
dissenting). See also Carrington & Castle, supra note 24, at 218; Gaming the System, supra note 
176; Another Choice of Forum, supra note 153 at 360–66; Resnik, supra note 176; Contracting for 
Procedure, supra note 176. 
 263 Weber v. PACT XPP Techs., AG, 811 F.3d 758, 763 (5th Cir. 2016). 
 264 Id. 
 265 Weber v. PACT XPP Techs., AG, No. 2:13-CV-0995-JRG-RSP, 2015 WL 13297959 (E.D. 
Tex. Feb. 25, 2015) at *1 (not designated for publication). 
 266 Weber, 811 F.3d at 763. 
 267 Id. at 763. 
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fired Weber without pay and told him the contract was illegal.268 Negotiation 
attempts failed and Weber sued PACT in the same federal district where he’d 
obtained PACT’s judgment.269 In response, PACT filed a parallel action in a 
German court and challenged Texas venue based on a vague clause in the 
contract it had declared void.270  
Weber had three arguments in support of the posistion that the federal 
court in Texas was the proper forum. The first argument was that the forum 
clause did not name a forum, but merely described its attribute as PACT’s 
base of operations, which Weber argued was the United States.271 The second 
argument was that the contract’s lack of a choice of law clause that should 
compel German law’s application.272 The third argument was based on 
PACT’s own assertion that the contract was invalid, which Weber argued 
also invalidated the forum clause and left Weber with his quantum meruit 
and promissory estoppel claims in the United States.273 In the trial and 
appellate courts, the resulting forum clause analysis was both consistent with 
Atlantic Marine and an example of that case’s severe favoring of 
questionable contracts over sound venue policy. 
1.  The District Court 
PACT filed a two-fold motion to dismiss, challenging personal 
jurisdiction in Texas and raising the German forum clause.274 The district 
court referred the motions to the magistrate judge, who first found personal 
jurisdiction in a cursory analysis based on the Supreme Court’s 2014 decision 
in Walden v. Fiore.275 Although the Weber analysis was short and omitted 
 
 268 Id. 
 269 Id. at 764. 
 270 Id. at 763–64. 
 271 Id. at 768–70. 
 272 Id. at 770–71. 
 273 Id. at 774–75. 
 274 Weber v. PACT XPP Techs., AG, No. 2:13-CV-0995-JRG-RSP, 2015 WL 1329759 (E.D. 
Tex. Feb. 25, 2015) at *1, aff’d 811 F.3d 758 (5th Cir. 2016) (not designated for publication). 
 275 Id. 
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essential components,276 the facts cited justified personal jurisdiction. 
Specifically, the magistrate judge noted that: 
PACT selected this forum and spent several years 
prosecuting its lawsuit here, going all the way through a jury 
trial, which was attended by officers of PACT. There is no 
dispute that the contract at issue in the current suit addressed 
the conduct of Plaintiff, as an officer of PACT, in attending 
that trial here in Texas. Furthermore, the proceeds of the 
judgment arising from that trial are the object of the recovery 
sought by Plaintiff from Defendant in this case.277  
These facts had equal bearing on the forum clause analysis but were never 
mentioned again in the district court or on appeal. Calling the jurisdictional 
analysis cursory is not to say it was legally inadequate, because any 
inadequacy was mooted by the dismissal on forum-clause grounds. That 
shorthand analysis is, however, an example of the summary disposition that 
continued in the case, and that I believe is encouraged by the severe Atlantic 
Marine presumption.  
Turning to the forum clause, the magistrate judge found the following 
points pertinent:  
• the parties’ original contract was in German with an 
English translation attached to Weber’s complaint;278   
 
 276 The magistrate judge’s opinion found personal jurisdiction without mentioning the long arm 
statute or the fair play and substantial justice test. Reference to the long arm statute is arguably 
unnecessary because Texas is a limits-of-due-process state, that is, its long arm defers to the 
minimum contacts test. See Int’l Energy Ventures Mgmt., LLC v. United Energy Grp., Ltd., 818 
F.3d 193, 212 (5th Cir. 2016). It is nonetheless standard to explain that because the due 
process/minimum contacts test itself is nothing more than a limit on long arm jurisdiction.  See id. 
The omission of the fair play and substantial justice test may be the result of that test’s analytical 
absence in Walden, although that misses the point that Walden and Weber had opposite holdings on 
personal jurisdiction.  The omission was proper in Walden because the Supreme Court found no 
contacts, thus obviating the fair play test. In Weber, the magistrate judge found contacts and based 
personal jurisdiction on that alone, which missed the second half of the due process test. See Burger 
King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 477 (1985). 
 277 Weber, 2015 WL 13297959 at *1. 
 278 Id. 
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• the contract was executed in both the United States 
(where Weber signed) and Germany (where PACT’s 
agent signed);279 
• Weber was a citizen of both the United States and 
Germany;280  
• PACT is a German corporation “with its principal 
business being the licensing and enforcement of its U.S. 
patents in this country;”281  
• the contract was a “compact agreement entitled 
Remuneration Arrangement” and contained a forum 
clause which according to Weber’s translation read, “To 
the extent permitted by law, jurisdiction and place of 
performance shall be the residence of PACT AG.”282 
In the original German, the forum clause used the term sitz, which Weber 
translated as “residence.”283 PACT disagreed and translated sitz as “seat” and 
that was the focus of the disputed translation.284 That is, Weber read the 
clause as naming PACT’s corporate residence, or where the operations were 
conducted, while PACT read it as corporate seat, the board’s location.285 
Based on these facts, and with no further analysis, the magistrate judge 
concluded that, “Despite Plaintiff’s arguments about the varying meanings 
of “residence” in English, the Court finds that the contract clearly 
contemplates the selection of a forum in Germany.”286 
Weber’s position was weak on the disputed meaning of sitz. As the 
appellate opinion notes, Weber’s own expert did not contest PACT’s 
 
 279 Id. 
 280 Id. The appellate opinion does not repeat the factfinding of Weber’s German citizenship but 
does note his birth there. See Weber v. PACT XPP Techs., AG, 811 F.3d 758, 772 (5th Cir. 2016). 
 281 Weber, 2015 WL 13297959 at *1. 
 282 Id. 
 283 Id. 
 284 Id. 
 285 Id. 
 286 Id. 
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translation of sitz as being a German term of art meaning “corporate seat.”287 
Of course, terms of art can mislead non-lawyers like Weber. What’s more, 
the German legal meaning does not render Weber’s generic understanding 
unreasonable, especially in light of Weber’s negotiation and signing of the 
contract in California,288 PACT’s initial corporate headquarters in 
California,289 and, most tellingly, PACT’s stated corporate purpose as “the 
licensing and enforcement of its U.S. patents,”290 which could only happen 
in the United States. More importantly, the court’s reliance on the German 
term of art sitzwas an implicit choice of German law as controlling the 
translation, interpretation, and construction of the parties’ contract, all done 
without a choice of law analysis. The magistrate judge’s opinion was based 
solely on Weber’s expert’s failure to rebut the German legal meaning of sitz, 
and there was no evidence of Weber having any understanding of sitz other 
than corporate residence.291 Weber’s understanding was supported by the 
location of PACT’s original office292 and the focus of its licensing and 
enforcement activities, both in the United States.293  
Weber had another argument:in Germany, where PACT had filed a 
parallel action, the German court issued an interlocutory judgment declaring 
Weber’s contract invalid.294 Weber used this judgment to argue that, if his 
employment contract failed, so did the forum clause. Back in Texas, the 
federal magistrate judge rejected this, applying the severability doctrine and 
holding that “the forum selection clause was not infected by the illegality that 
underlies the declaration of invalidity of the overall agreement.”295 In 
 
 287 Weber, 811 F.3d at 769. 
 288 Weber, 2015 WL 13297959 at *1. 
 289 As of September 23, 2017, PACT’s Bloomberg entry stated that “PACT XPP Technologies 
AG was founded in 1996 and is based in Los Gatos, California.” See Software Company Overview 
of PACT XPP Technologies AG, 
http://www.bloomberg.com/research/stocks/private/snapshot.asp?privcapId=21842619 (last visited 
Sept. 23, 2017). 
 290 Weber, 2015 WL 13297959 at *1. 
 291 See Weber, 811 F.3d at 769. 
 292 See supra note 289. 
 293 See Weber, 2015 WL 13297959 at *1. 
 294 Id. at *2. 
 295 Id. 
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reaching the conclusion that an otherwise per se invalid contract can have a 
lone non-substantive clause that survives, the court relied on Afram Carriers, 
Inc. v. Moeykens.296 In Afram, the contract was a partial settlement agreement 
for a wrongful death claim arising in Peru. The agreement paid the decedent’s 
family $2,000 in return for an agreement to litigate in Peru. Plaintiff sought 
to set aside the contract as fraudulently obtained while defendant argued for 
enforcement. The Afram court noted that it could not inquire of the settlement 
contract itself without getting to the merits of the case and thus undermining 
the contract’s designation of Peruvian courts to determine the merits.297 
Afram is an example of the well-criticized chicken-and-egg problem with 
forum clauses,298but, even if Afram’s logic is valid, it doesn’t apply in Weber. 
The reason is that Afram involved a plaintiff’s allegation of contract 
invalidity, while in Weber, it was defendant PACT—the forum clause 
proponent—who not only challenged the validity of the parties’ contract but 
had already obtained a judgment invalidating it.  
With the survival of the forum clause in an otherwise completely invalid 
contract, the magistrate judge noted the next step—the application of the 
forum-non-conveniens balancing factors dictated by Atlantic Marine.299 
Without articulating the doctrine’s elements or the supporting facts, the 
magistrate judge concluded that, “[t]he Court finds that just as in Atlantic 
Marine, there are no circumstances here that would lead the Court to 
disregard the term of the forum selection clause.”300 
The magistrate judge’s recommendation for dismissal is an example of 
the short-handed analysis that the Atlantic Marine presumption encourages. 
There was no discussion of the forum clause being permissive or mandatory. 
There was no choice of law analysis but instead a simple application of legal 
rules that appear to be drawn from a mix of federal common law and German 
 
 296 Id. (discussing Afram Carriers v. Moeykens, 145 F.3d 298, 301 (5th Cir. 1998)). 
 297 See Afram, 145 F.3d at 301. 
297 See Afram, 145 F.3d at 301. 
 298 See infra notes 425–468 and accompanying text. 
 299 Weber, 2015 WL 13297959 at *2 (quoting Atl. Marine, 571 U.S. at 60). 
 300 Id. 
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law. There was no analysis of the public factors in the forum-non-conveniens 
test as required by Atlantic Marine.301  
The district court summarily adopted the magistrate judge’s 
recommendation with one paragraph reciting that the court had reviewed 
Weber’s objections and found the magistrate judge’s recommendation 
neither clearly erroneous nor contrary to law.302 The court addressed none of 
Weber’s points but did note that most of his arguments were not previously 
pleaded or addressed in the earlier briefs.303 In making this criticism, the court 
did not distinguish the inappropriate points from those it had assessed in 
dismissing the case. As for the newly-raised points, the court’s docket shows 
that Weber presented a motion to reconsider to the magistrate judge which 
was declined without being addressed.304  
2.  Appellate Review  
The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals upheld the dismissal but corrected the 
trial court’s cursory analysis. The appellate opinion started with a persuasive 
resolution of two post-Atlantic Marine issues—the standard of appellate 
review and the governing law—both first-impression analyses. On standard 
of review, Weber argued for a de novo review to displace any deference to 
the trial court’s dismissal of his case. PACT argued for an abuse-of-discretion 
standard. The court adopted a mixed review standard, examining clause 
interpretation and enforceability de novo and the balancing-of-convenience 
factors under abuse of discretion.305 
 
 301 See id. (citing Atl. Marine, 571 U.S. at 60–62 and concluding that its factors did not favor 
Weber). 
 302 Weber, 2015 WL 13298144 at *1. 
 303 Id. 
 304 See court docket entry numbers 29 & 30, filed May 2, 2014, Weber v. PACT XPP Techs., 
AG, No. 2:13-CV-0995-JRG-RSP, 2015 WL 13298144 [hereinafter “Weber Court Docket”]. As 
the Weber Court Docket states, docket entry number 29 & 30 are sealed and thus unavailable for 
review. They are cited here only for the notation that certain motions and responses were filed, and 
not for the content of those motions and responses. 
 305 See Weber, 811 F.3d at 767–68. Prior to Atlantic Marine, the Fifth Circuit had used de novo 
review for the entire forum clause analysis because it deemed the issue to be wrongful venue 
governed by Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(3). Id. at 767 (citing Chalix-Chacon v. Glob. Int’l Marine, Inc., 
493 F.3d 507, 510 (5th Cir. 2007)). Atlantic Marine clarified the issue as one of convenient forum 
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With the standard of review compelling de novo consideration of the 
forum clause’s interpretation, the court noted that the initial question was 
whether the clause was mandatory or permissive. A permissive clause merely 
waives a party’s objection to the chosen jurisdiction and does not forbid filing 
elsewhere.306 Thus, if the German clause was permissive, Weber would be 
subject to German jurisdiction but not barred from pursing a parallel Texas 
action. On the other hand, under Atlantic Marine a valid mandatory clause 
designating a foreign court requires a federal court to dismiss the action in 
deference to that foreign court unless extraordinary circumstances compel 
retention.307  
Noting that “shall” does not always create a mandatory forum clause,308 
the Weber court devised a three-step approach: (1) find the best translation 
for the German-language forum clause to determine its 
mandatory/permissive nature; (2) follow the Erie Doctrine’s directive to 
apply Texas choice of law rules to select a governing substantive law; and 
(3) apply that law to determine if the clause is mandatory.309 Although the 
court labeled this function as “interpretation” (assessing the contracting 
parties’ intent), it was limited to construing the legal meaning of the German 
term sitz, ignoring the term’s alternate meaning of “residence.”310 To be clear, 
 
without announcing the standard of review because that case was remanded for the application of 
the new guidelines. See Atl. Marine, 571 U.S. at 68. 
 306 See Weber, 811 F.3d at 768. 
 307 See Atl. Marine, 571 U.S. at 60–61; see also Weber, 811 F.3d at 768 for discussion of 
mandatory clauses. 
 308 See Weber, 811 F.3d at 768, 768 n.14. 
 309 Id. at 769. As to step 2 and the Erie Doctrine, the court gave no reason for its switch from 
federal common law to Erie, although that approach is endorsed by some courts and commentators. 
The Erie view is certainly a valid argument, looking at forum clauses as contract questions governed 
by state law. There’s an equally good argument that forum clauses are jurisdiction-allocating 
questions and thus procedural even though a contract is involved. The contract/procedure split takes 
on added significance in federal court where the Erie approach would defeat uniform treatment, 
although that problem arises with any state law question in federal court. 
 310 Id. at 768–71; for the distinction between interpretation and construction, see RESTATEMENT 
(SECOND) CONFLICT OF LAWS § 204 cmt. a (AM. LAW INST. 1971), discussed at Governing Law, 
supra note 155 at 654 n.39.  The court cited no evidence of Weber’s own understanding other than 
he thought sitz meant principle place of business, see Weber, 811 F.3d at 769, which he interpreted 
as his operating site as CEO. On the related point of governing law, the court later acknowledged 
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it is not necessarily wrong to use German law to translate a German-language 
contract, even prior to the choice-of-law analysis, especially as to the 
substantive provisions. It becomes a stretch when applying German law to 
ascertain a vaguely-identified forum, and in doing so, ignoring non-legal 
definitions that a party might have reasonably relied on. Specifically, the only 
cited evidence of Weber’s understanding was that sitz meant PACT’s 
principal place of business where the CEO Weber operated, as explained 
below. 
a.  Clause Interpretation/Construction in Three Steps   
Step one was to “determine the best possible English rendering of the 
forum clause.”311 In spite of the forum clause’s vague forum identity, the 
court of appeals easily settled on PACT’s translation that sitz, as used in the 
Remuneration Arrangement, was a German term of art meaning “corporate 
seat.”312 Weber’s argument was based only on his understanding of the 
generic language as meaning “residence” which he thought the equivalent of 
“principal place of business.”313 He offered no legal support regarding the 
German term of art, and his own expert conceded PACT’s translation that the 
German legal meaning was corporate seat, which by this time was Munich.314 
The court thus adopted PACT’s translation because it found PACT’s 
argument to be unrebutted.315 Unrebutted arguments generally win, but the 
problem here is that the court’s conclusion rested not merely on German 
language, but on German law at a point prior to any choice of law analysis. 
That decision, ironically, was made as a means of setting up the choice of 
law analysis, an example of the chicken-and-egg problem that can plague 
forum-clause analytics.316 German law, of course, is appropriate to construe 
 
that there was no evidence indicating that Weber understood the contract pointed to German law. 
See Weber, 811 F.3d at 773 (“This factor is more or less a wash . . . .”). 
 311 Weber, 811 F.3d at 769. 
 312 Id. 
 313 Id. 
 314 Id. 
 315 Id. 
 316 See infra notes 425–428 and accompanying text for a discussion of the chicken and egg 
problem in forum clause analysis. 
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the meaning of German terms of art, but contract interpretation is not 
necessarily dependent on legal terminology. The unrefuted evidence was that 
Weber understood sitz to mean the corporation’s residence, which at the 
outset was in Los Gatos, California.317  
Step two was to “apply Texas choice of law rules to determine which 
substantive law governs forum-clause interpretation.”318 Because Atlantic 
Marine did not address the law governing forum clauses,319 and because 
Weber’s magistrate judge and district court did not consider the issue, the 
Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals addressed it freshly.320 Weber argued for 
federal common law as the interpretive standard and PACT argued for 
German law.321 The court first conceded that Weber’s approach (focused on 
the forum clause’s contract issues as ancillary to the underlying venue 
question) had been used in the Fifth Circuit, and further noted differing 
approaches in other circuits.322 The court then shifted its view from a venue 
approach to contract which led to the Erie Doctrine and local state law.323  
Accordingly, the court looked to what it deemed the appropriate Texas 
choice-of-law rule, the Restatement (Second) Conflict of Laws.324 This 
choice ignored a superseding Texas statute on corporate internal affairs, but 
 
 317 See supra note 289 (citing Software Company Overview of PACT XPP Technologies AG, 
http://www.bloomberg.com/research/stocks/private/snapshot.asp?privcapId=21842619 (last visited 
Sept. 23, 2017)). 
 318 Weber, 811 F.3d at 769. 
 319 See Five Questions, supra note 153153 at 766–68. 
 320 Id. 
 321 Weber, 811 F.3d at 770–73. Other possible choices in a federal diversity case are (1) the law 
chosen by in parties’ contract (inapplicable here), (2) federal venue law, see Wong v. Party Gaming 
Ltd., 589 F.3d 821, 827 (6th Cir. 2009) (describing cases from six circuits to this effect), discussed 
at Five Questions, supra note 153 at 768. For arguments on the Erie approach, see Another Choice 
of Forum, supra note 153 at 332–39. 
 322 See Weber, 811 F.3d at 770–71. 
 323 Id. (citing Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 641 (1938) and Klaxon v. Stentor Elec. Mfg. 
Co., 313 U.S. 487 (1941)). The court’s adherence to Erie apparently rests on the notion that forum 
clause issues require contract analysis under state law. In spite of the logic there, most federal courts 
characterize forum clause analysis as a private agreement affecting jurisdiction or venue and 
accordingly apply federal common law. See Five Questions, supra note 153 at 768 (also making an 
argument for Erie and state law). 
 324 See Weber, 811 F.3d at 771–73. 
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the result would have been the same.325 To the extent Peter Weber had 
nothing but a contract claim and to the extent the Restatement governed, the 
court did a thorough analysis under both the general balancing test and the 
specific contract sections.326 The court gave special attention to Restatement 
section 196’s rule that service contracts are presumptively governed by the 
place of service, with the presumption strengthened in contracts designating 
the place of service.327 Weber’s Remuneration Agreement was in fact 
couched in those terms, although the court treated it as designating Munich, 
Germany when it only designated the corporate sitz.328 Nonetheless, the court 
made an otherwise-supportable finding that sitz meant Munich, even though 
it depended on an application of German law that had not yet been chosen.329 
This was the second time the court applied German law before finishing its 
choice of law analysis.330  
The court then matched the dispute’s ample German contacts to various 
Restatement factors, appropriately conceding a few neutral factors,331 and 
concluded that German law controlled the contract’s interpretation.332 Peter 
Weber’s contract focused on his service to the PACT board, and that service 
 
 325 See TEX. BUS. ORGS. CODE §§ 1.102–.103, 1.105 (West 2009) (designating the law of the 
state of incorporation to govern a corporation’s internal affairs).  For further discussion, see infra 
notes 432–434 and accompanying text. 
 326 Weber, 811 F.3d at 771–73. 
 327 Id. at 772. The court quoted a well-known Texas precedent on that point, an irony because 
that Texas case rejected the employment contract’s choice of law clause in favor of Texas forum 
law. See id. (quoting DeSantis v. Wackenhut Corp., 793 S.W.2d 670, 679 (Tex. 1990)). 
 328 See Exhibit A to Complaint, Weber v. PACT XPP Techs. AG, No. 2:13-CV-0995-JRG-RSP, 
2015 WL 13297959 (E.D. Tex. Feb. 25, 2015), report and recommendation adopted, No. 2:13-CV-
09995-JRG-RSP, 2015 WL 13298144 (E.D. Tex. Mar. 24, 2015), aff’d, 811 F.3d 758 (5th Cir. 
2016) [hereinafter Remuneration Agreement]. 
 329 See Weber, 811 F.3d at 772–73. 
 330 See supra note 310 and accompanying text. 
 331 The court noted, for example, that the place-of-contracting and place-of-negotiation factors 
were neutral because they were done in both the United States and Germany, and that justified 
expectations did not clearly favor Germany. See Weber, 811 F.3d at 772–773. 
 332 Id. 
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was contractually defined as occurring at the corporate sitz which was now 
legally defined as Munich, Germany.333 
If his claim was limited to that contract, then its forum clause designating 
the German sitz would be appropriate. Weber’s complaint, however, included 
a quantum meruit claim for his work done over a five-year period in the Texas 
litigation.334 When the Texas Supreme Court adopted the Restatement’s most 
significant relationship approach for cases not governed by statutes, it 
specifically included what is known as a dépeçage requirement.335 Dépeçage 
is the practice of splitting the choice of law analysis on an issue-by-issue 
basis in order to limit the application of non-Texas law to appropriate 
issues.336 As discussed in the section below, the court ignored dépeçage and 
imputed the contract conclusions to the non-contractual claims.337  
Step three was to “apply that substantive law to the forum clause language 
to decide whether it is mandatory or permissive”338 With German law 
applying, the court plugged in PACT’s expert’s conclusion that German law 
viewed the clause as valid and mandatory.339 Weber’s expert did not oppose, 
and the court concluded its three-step approach with findings that Weber’s 
remuneration contract referred to a German situs, that Texas choice-of-law 
rules pointed to German law as controlling the contract’s interpretation 
(although that decision had already been used in step one), and that German 
 
 333 Id. It is interesting how the contract, drafted by PACT, is neatly tailored to focus on Weber’s 
service as limited to board service in Munich, when the contemplated effort was exploiting PACT’s 
United States patent. The contract also contemplated Weber’s compensation as coming from either 
licensing or patent-infringement damages in the United States, which is what happened. This is 
reflected in part by the magistrate’s judge’s finding that Weber’s contract was payment for profit 
from the Texas patent suit. See Weber, 2015 WL 13297959 at *1. The express terms of Weber’s 
contract did not address that, and Weber accordingly brought equitable claims for quantum meruit 
based on his successful efforts in the patent-infringement litigation. 
   334 Weber, 811 F.3d at 764. 
 335 Maxus Exploration Co. v. Moran Bros., 817 S.W.2d 50, 53 (Tex. 1991). 
 336 Id. 
 337 See infra notes 388–439 and accompanying text. 
 338 Id. at 769. 
 339 Id. at 773. The court appropriately stopped short of giving preclusive effect to the German 
decision, presumably because it was not final. 
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law would enforce the forum clause.340 There was no discussion of that 
process’s application to Weber’s non-contractual claim.￼341 
b.  Enforceability Under Forum Non Conveniens  
With the German sitz clause deemed an agreement for a German forum, 
the court addressed the final Atlantic Marine question, the clause’s 
enforceability under federal common law.  The court began by noting again 
the Supreme Court’s strong enforceability presumption for valid forum 
clauses.342 Again the court failed to address the elements of validity or 
whether they exist here other than to say they are presumed, and that the 
presumption may be overcome by forum non conveniens factors, limited to 
the public factors, and with the burden on plaintiff.343 Weber had four 
arguments for nonenforcement and the first was his lack of a remedy in 
Germany where equity is unavailable.344 There had been a dispute between 
the experts with PACT’s expert testifying that German law had remedies akin 
to equity while Weber’s expert testified he would lose because of German 
law regarding work done by corporate directors.345 The court found for PACT 
on this, noting that the lack of an equivalent remedy was not grounds for 
denial. Instead, it is the availability of remedy that mattered, not predictions 
of his winning on those theories.346 
Weber’s second argument was PACT’s use of a forum clause from a 
contract already held invalid at PACT’s request.347 This was the severability 
 
  340 Id. at 770, 776. 
   341 Id. at 773. 
 342 Id. (quoting Haynsworth v. Corp., 121 F.3d 956, 962–63 (5th Cir. 1997), in turn quoting M/S 
Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1, 10 (1972)). 
 343 See Weber, 811 F.3d at 773–74. 
   344 Id. at 765. 
 345 Id. at 773. PACT’s second expert report on which the court relied is sealed and unavailable 
for evaluation. See Weber Court Docket, supra note 304 at document entry numbers 29 & 30. 
 346 See Weber, 811 F.3d at 773–74. This point is standard for both forum clauses, see e.g. 
Bremen, 407 U.S. 1, 15–16 and forum non conveniens, see Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 
235, 255 (1981). It would be valid if Weber had knowingly agreed to a German forum instead of 
the sitz forum. 
 347 Id. at 774. 
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issue.348 The court treated this argument as though Weber were alleging the 
Remuneration Arrangement’s invalidity which ignored the German court’s 
declaration of invalidity.349 The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals concluded that 
Weber had misstated PACT’s litigation position in the German case along 
with the German court’s ruling.350 Specifically, the Fifth Circuit Court of 
Appeals explained that neither PACT nor the German court took the position 
that no contract was ever formed.351  Instead, according to the Fifth Circuit 
Court of Appeals, PACT and the German court took the position that the 
forum clause was not only valid, but also severable from the contract’s 
substantive provisions.352 The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals reasoned that 
this made sense because the German court decision was based not on contract 
law but on corporate law governing compensation of board members.353 This 
conclusion overlooks the obvious point that the German corporate law in 
question was dealing with a contract for payment for services, of which the 
forum clause was an integral part. In any event, the Fifth Circuit Court of 
Appeals concluded: 
Thus, the parties validly contracted for the FSC itself—they 
just did not comply with regulatory forms as to the 
compensation provisions because the shareholders never 
voted in favor of that arrangement.354 
 
 348 Id. 
 349 See Weber, 811 F.3d at 774–75 (stating that Weber’s theory “misstates both the litigation 
position that PACT adopted in the German litigation and the actual ruling of the German court.”) 
The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals goes on to note the German court’s ruling based on severability, 
ignoring the Weber’s argument that the substantive contract was invalid from the start. Id. 
 350 Id. at 776. 
 351 Id. 
 352 Id. 
 353 See generally id. Interestingly, on this point the court was willing to split the choice-of-law 
analysis on the issue of corporate law and contract law, a practice called dépeçage that is required 
by Texas choice of law rules. See Duncan v. Cessna Aircraft Co., 665 S.W.2d 414, 421 (Tex. 1984). 
The court veered from Texas law when it declined dépeçage when considering Weber’s distinct 
remedies under contract law (for services on the board) and equity (for work done in Texas). See 
infra notes 438–439 and accompanying text. 
 354 Weber, 811 F.3d at 775. 
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Regarding severability, instead of relying on Afram as the magistrate 
judge had, the appellate court invoked Haynsworth v. The Corp., a 1997 Fifth 
Circuit case involving a fraud claim against a Lloyd’s insurer by its syndicate 
members.355 The holding was the same as that in Afram, for the same 
reason.356 Those cases, along with Scherk, hold that a derogating plaintiff 
may not raise fraud or overreaching by attacking the overall contract, but 
must attack the forum clause specifically.357  The reason is that, to reach the 
contract issues would be litigating the merits that, if the forum clause is valid, 
should be litigated in the chosen forum. That ignores Weber’s challenge, 
where the underlying contract had already been invalidated by the chosen 
German forum.  
The court also pointed out that Weber’s attack only went to the contract 
as a whole and not to the forum clause.358 But that’s the point—the contract 
as a whole was invalid. The court’s view is that Weber contracted separately 
for the forum clause as a distinct agreement, addressing it this way: 
Arguments that go to the validity of the contract as a whole 
do not prevent enforcement of an FSC; instead, the party 
seeking to avoid enforcement must demonstrate that the FSC 
is invalid rather than merely claim the contract is invalid. In 
effect, the court is to treat the FSC as both severable and 
presumptively valid.359 
The court thus deemed Weber to have contracted for a German forum apart 
from his right to be compensated.360 
Weber’s third argument for non-enforcement was estoppel based on 
PACT’s reliance on a contract it had now legally voided.361 This argument 
 
   355 Haynsworth v. Corp., 121 F.3d 956 (5th Cir. 1997), discussed at Weber, 811 F.3d at 774. 
   356 Weber v. PACT XPP Techs., AG, No. 2:13-CV-0995-JRG-RSP, 2015 WL 1329759 (E.D. 
Tex. Feb 25, 2015) at *4 (not designated for publication). 
 357 See Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506, 519 (1974); Afram Carriers, Inc. v. 
Moeykens, 145 F.3d 298, 301 (5th Cir. 1998); Haynsworth, 121 F.3d at 964. 
 358 Weber, 811 F.3d at 775. 
 359 Id. at 773–74 (citation omitted). 
   360 Id. 
 361 Id. 
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also failed because of severability.362 His fourth argument was based on 
PACT’s unclean hands, arguing that PACT acted inequitably when it invoked 
the contract’s invalidity.363 The court rejected this on two grounds. First it 
relied on its recent holding in that a plaintiff cannot “deny a defendant access 
to equitable remedies just by alleging fraud . . . .”364 Second, the court stated 
that Weber was putting the cart before the horse by raising the Remuneration 
Arrangement’s validity, an issue on the merits which should be done in 
Germany if the forum clause was enforceable.365 Once again, both grounds 
mischaracterize Weber’s position as relying only on PACT’s allegations of 
contract invalidity rather the German court’s holding of invalidity.366 As to 
carts before horses, and getting to the merits, the German court had already 
ruled on the merits of this issue.367 
Disposing of Weber’s four arguments for non-enforcement, the court took 
up the last step—the forum non conveniens public balancing factors, with the 
private factors eliminated under the Atlantic Marine formula.368 The court of 
appeals listed the factors369 and then noted Atlantic Marine’s emphasis on the 
light weight to be given public interest factors in forum clause analyses: 
And the Court in Atlantic Marine, 134 S.Ct. at 582, made 
certain its view that the public-interest actors would 
outweigh a valid forum clause only in truly extraordinary 
cases: The factors ‘‘will rarely defeat a transfer motion,’’ so 
‘‘the practical result is that [FSCs] should control except in 
 
 362 Id. at 775. 
   363 Id. at 765. 
 364 In re Lloyd’s Register N. Am., Inc., 780 F.3d 283, 293 (5 th Cir. 2015), cert. denied, Pearl 
Seas Cruises, LLC v. Lloyd’s Register N. Am., Inc., 136 S. Ct. 64 (2015). 
 365 Weber, 811 F.3d at 775. 
 366 Id. at 765 (noting the German declaratory judgment in August, 2014). 
   367 Id. 
 368 See id. at 767 (citing Atl. Marine, 571 U.S. at 65–66). 
 369 “The public-interest factors for FNC include ‘administrative difficulties flowing from court 
congestion; the local interest in having localized controversies decided at home; the interest in 
having the trial of a diversity case in a forum that is at home with the law that must govern the 
action; the avoidance of unnecessary problems in conflict of laws, or in the application of foreign 
law; and the unfairness of burdening citizens in an unrelated forum with jury duty.’ Piper Aircraft, 
454 U.S. at 260 n. 6, 102 S. Ct. 252 (internal quotations omitted).” Weber, 811 F.3d at 776. 
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unusual cases.’’ ‘‘Although it is ‘conceivable in a particular 
case’ that the district court ‘would refuse to transfer a case 
notwithstanding the counterweight of [an FSC],’ such cases 
will not be common.’’ (citation omitted).370 
 The court’s only other consideration in the balancing test was to observe 
that Weber offered a two-page argument which the court summarized as 
“variations on the claim that Texas and the United States have an interest in 
protecting their citizens from abuse by foreign corporations.”371  The court 
did not parse the two pages of variations any further and held that they were 
not the sort of exceptional circumstances required to set aside a forum clause. 
With that, the court of appeals affirmed the dismissal with the closing 
language: 
Given the Supreme Court’s strong admonitions in favor of 
dismissal and against retention save for extraordinary 
matters, the district court was well within the bounds of it 
considerable discretion in dismissing.372 
B.  Concerns in Weber’s Discretionary Application of Atlantic 
Marine’s Severe Presumption 
In Weber, three judges agreed that the ephemeral PACT forum clause 
should be enforced.373  Their decision is consistent with the Atlantic Marine 
presumption and it resulted in the dismissal of a compensation claim for work 
done in the United States, mostly in Texas.374  Although the contract’s 
wording was limited to events that PACT argued happened in Munich, the 
dismissal occurred without reference to that work and the related quantum 
meruit claim, and instead focused only on the contract limited to Munich 
service, and whose substantive provisions were wholly invalid.375  The judges 
further agreed that the contract’s substantive invalidity did not negate the 
 
 370 Weber, 811 F.3d at 776. 
 371 Id. 
 372 Id. 
   373 Id. at 776. 
   374 Id. 
   375 Id. at 775. 
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binding nature of its sole surviving provision, a venue clause which failed to 
name a forum.376  Altogether, there are six troubling points, all traceable to 
the extreme Atlantic Marine presumption. 
1.  Validity 
Starting with Bremen in 1972, commentators have criticized the Supreme 
Court’s weak attention to forum clause validity. The current validity 
approach originated with Bremen’s statement that “such clauses are prima 
facie valid and should be enforced unless enforcement is shown by the 
resisting party to be ‘unreasonable’ under the circumstances.”377 The 
Supreme Court provided no direct explanation for the quotes around 
“unreasonable”378—they may refer to the Judge Wisdom’s dissent in the 
Bremen appellate opinion, but are also ironic in light of subsequent case law 
like Carnival Cruise. The Bremen Court goes on to discuss defenses to 
enforcement including (1) fraud, (2) overreaching, (3) the designated forum’s  
neutrality, (4) the strong public policy of the derogating forum (statutory or 
judicial), and (5) serious inconvenience.379 Another formulation is Justice 
Kennedy’s concurring praise of the Stewart majority’s adoption of § 1404(a) 
for non-admiralty cases, which “should be exercised so that a valid forum-
selection clause is given controlling weight in all but the most exceptional 
cases.”380 Once again, this formulation assumes a valid clause, without 
guidance as to assessing a validity. 
Critics, throughout the years since 1972, have pointed out the judiciary’s 
leap over validity and other issues. Professor Taylor attributes the confusion 
to the use of two distinct analytical approaches – contract (Carnival Cruise) 
and venue (Stewart).381 The confusion is not limited to that doctrinal conflict, 
as Taylor explains further: 
 
   376 Id. at 765. 
 377 M.S. Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1, 10 (1972). 
   378 Id. 
 379 Id. at 15–19. 
 380 Stewart Org., Inc. v. Ricoh Corp., 487 U.S. 22, 33 (1988) (Kennedy, J. concurring). 
 381 See generally Tale of Two Concepts, supra note 89. 
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Unfortunately, the apparent simplicity of the forum selection 
clause has proven seductive. In the rush to embrace it as a 
tool of commercial and judicial expediency, courts and 
commentators have concentrated on the development and 
application of a standard for enforcement without first 
defining exactly what the concept is to which the standard 
applies. They have merged the concepts of jurisdiction, 
venue, and choice of law into the forum selection clause.382 
Atlantic Marine did not improve on these conceptual shortcomings. 
Under its supposed improvement of the Bremen formula, validity continues 
to have the paradox of being crucial but undefined and presumed. As 
Professor Sachs explains, the presumptively valid clause’s enforcement is 
“virtually automatic” except in extraordinary circumstances, and yet the 
crucial analysis is reduced to a footnote explanation that validity is 
presupposed.383 The court offered no discussion of validity’s components 
other than the presence of the parties’ contract, and no discussion of whether 
the validity is the same as for substantive contracts, or if there is anything 
special about a contract for venue and jurisdiction. 384 It is simply a given, 
with the burden on the derogating plaintiff to negate validity according to 
unclear guidelines.385  
In Weber, there was no discussion of elements of forum clause validity 
other than the presumption favoring them, which is consistent with Atlantic 
Marine.386 That’s not to say that “validity” is unimportant to the opinion, but 
 
 382 Tale of Two Concepts, supra note 89 at 786–87 (footnotes omitted). 
 383 See Five Questions, supra note 153 at 766; Gaming the System, supra note 176 at 727–30. 
The Court’s repeated reliance on the undefined term “extraordinary circumstances raises an 
interesting question: The edict’s corollary phrasing is that forum clauses are entitled to presumed 
validity and enforcement under ordinary circumstances. Many lawsuits arise from circumstances 
outside the ordinary, and outside those contemplated by the parties at the time of drafting. Even so, 
I’m not aware of this approach being used. 
   384 Atl. Marine Constr. Co. v. U.S. Dist. Court, 571 U.S. 49, 67 (2013). 
 385 See Id. at 62 n. 5. 
 386 The Weber appellate opinion appropriately invoked the Atlantic Marine presumption but, as 
Circuits are inclined to do, attributed it to its own circuit precedent. See Weber v. PACT XPP Techs., 
A.G., 811 F.3d 758, 773 (5th Cir. 2016), citing Haynsworth v. Corp., 121 F.3d 956, 962–63 (5th 
Cir. 1997), in turn quoting Bremen, 407 U.S. at 7. 
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its role is limited to word use. The Weber appellate opinion uses some form 
of “valid” (validity, invalid, etc.) twenty-eight times, with sixteen referring 
specifically to forum clause validity.387  All sixteen are descriptive or 
conclusory. None are analytical.  Although the court repeatedly identified 
issues as validity and enforceability,388 it analyzed the issues as (1) 
identifying the FC as mandatory or permissive, and (2) enforceability.389 
Peter Weber had no hope of contesting validity because the court linked 
validity to the contract’s legal meaning under German law.  Because Weber’s 
view was based on his own understanding of corporate seat rather than 
knowledge of German terms of art, he had no means of challenging the 
contract’s assumed validity.390 To the extent the court’s characterization of 
this service contract is accurate, it all flows from a clause that fails to name a 
forum and instead merely lists one attribute—the corporate seat—and in 
doing so uses language that also supports an interpretation of the seat at where 
the it was founded (California) and where it’s CEO executes his duties. 391 
Validity also raises choice-of-law questions:which law governs validity, 
is it a procedural or substantive question, and whether federal courts should 
apply state or federal law.  Although the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals did 
not analyze validity in Weber, it found that the German court had ruled the 
forum clause to be valid and enforceable.392 While German law might be 
appropriate for contract interpretation or construction in Weber, it is not clear 
at all that German law should apply to initial validity. Atlantic Marine did 
not hold that. ￼393 
The Supreme Court has never defined validity and, instead, presumes 
validity, shifting the burden to the derogating plaintiff to prove invalidity 
under a steep burden governed by an undefined law.394 But the Court has 
never given guidance for plaintiff’s burden other than suggesting defenses 
 
   387 Id. at 763-776. 
 388 Weber, 811 F.3d at 763, 764, 775 n. 26, 776. 
 389 Id. at 763, 765–66, 767, 770. 
   390 Id. at 765. 
   391 Id. at 763. 
 392 See Id. at 774. 
   393 Atl. Marine, 571 U.S. 49 at 60. 
   394 Id. 
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that are raised once the clause is determined valid.395 What is the effect if the 
entire substantive contract is invalid? That was true in Weber, but the 
contract’s substantive invalidity did not matter because of the conclusion-
assuming function the court used under the current Bremen formula.396 That 
failure goes not so much to the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals, but to the 
Supreme Court’s ill-founded approach. 
2.  Forum Identity—Are Hints Enough? 
The Weber/PACT contract did not name a jurisdiction and instead merely 
described its attribute as the company’s residence or seat.397 A purported 
mandatory forum clause that fails to name a forum should arguably be per se 
invalid, or at least lose its presumed validity and place a burden on the 
proponent.398 The Weber appellate opinion addressed the concept of 
specificity before ignoring it:  
An FSC is mandatory only if it contains clear language 
specifying that litigation must occur in the specified forum—
and language merely indicating that the courts of a particular 
place ‘‘shall have jurisdiction’’ (or similar) is insufficient to 
make an FSC mandatory.399 
This quote refers to specificity for the forum clause’s mandatory or 
permissive nature but also mentions “the specified forum.” 400 
Venue laws, of course, also fail to name the forum and instead merely 
describes its attributes, such as defendant’s residence or where the cause of 
action arose.401 Those descriptions can lead to litigation. But in those cases, 
 
 395 See generally Gaming the System, supra note 176. See also Five Questions, supra note 153 
at 766–68. 
  396 Weber, 811 F.3d at 776. 
   397 Id. at 763. 
 398 “Floating forum clauses” anticipate multiple litigation sites and are ambiguous by design. 
See Paul H. Cross & Hubert Oxford IV, “Floating” Forum Selection and Choice of Law Clauses, 
48 S. TEX. L. REV. 125 (Fall 2006). That concept does not apply in Weber even though the clause 
is worded in a way that would support a floating clause. 
 399 Weber, 811 F.3d at 768. 
   400 Id. 
 401 Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 15.002. 
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the concepts are (1) governed by the forum’s procedural law, (2) drawn from 
tighter concepts and precedents, and (3) do not involve party intent except 
the objective intent with residency. With the current law of forum clauses, 
the analytical boundaries are an ill-defined mix of substantive and procedural 
law. 
In the real world of contracting dynamics, if describing the forum instead 
of naming it did not confuse a contracting party, then the failure to name 
would not be important.  But in this case, the failure to name Germany left 
room for Weber to believe that PACT’s sitz was California, PACT’s original 
base of operations.402 The Weber trial and appellate courts noted the 
ambiguity and then found that ambiguity in the drafter’s favor based not on 
the parties’ mutual understanding but on the unambiguous legal meaning of 
the German term of art sitz.403 
As discussed in this article’s history section, the late twentieth century 
saw a shift to contract theory for forum clause analysis.404  The contract view 
is dominant now but venue analysis still has support. Whichever theory is 
used, failing to name the forum seems to violate contract law (no meeting of 
the minds on an essential term) and venue basics (due process notice). 
Jurisdictions have names and forum clauses should use them. 
3.  Severability and Alice’s Cheshire Cat 
Peter Weber initially had an oral agreement with PACT that his 
compensation would be deferred until his efforts made a profit for the 
company.405  In 2008 the parties reduced that to writing signed by Weber and 
a PACT board representative, but never ratified by PACT’s shareholders.406 
When PACT fired Weber and refused to pay, Weber sued in the United States 
and PACT invoked two crucial features of the Remuneration Agreement. 
One, the substantive provisions were invalid for lack of shareholder approval, 
and two, the forum clause limited litigation to Munich Germany.407 At the 
 
 402 Weber, 811 F.3d at 772. 
 403 Id. 
 404 See supra at Part II.C, Post-Bremen Analytics. 
 405 Weber, 811 F.3d at 763. 
 406 See Remuneration Agreement, supra note Error! Bookmark not defined.. 
 407 Weber, 811 F.3d at 764. 
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trial level in the United States, the federal magistrate judge concluded that 
the forum clause was severable from the contract’s substantive provisions 
and thus recommended dismissal in favor of the German litigation already 
underway.408 The district court approved and dismissed the case.409 On 
appeal, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals made the same severability finding 
based on a different Fifth Circuit precedent.￼410 
Contract severability is a commonly-used and well-accepted doctrine that 
the contracting parties’ mistaken inclusion of illegal terms should not void 
the entire contract, but how far should it go? Perhaps it rests on the parties’ 
mutual intent, but what if essential terms are void? What if a majority of the 
terms are void? What if all substantive provisions of the contract are illegal, 
but the otherwise illegal contract has a forum clause designating a jurisdiction 
that will hold the contract illegal. Does one purely procedural clause survive 
when the rest of the contract fails? Weber’s answer is an unquestioned yes, 
based on cases in which those facts were not present.411 
Weber’s use of the severability doctrine is the legal equivalent of Alice’s 
Cheshire cat who could disappear except for its toothy grin.412  Just like the 
cat, the PACT remuneration agreement disappeared as to all substance and 
left only the forum clause’s grin, imposing a jurisdiction which had already 
made interim rulings negating Weber’s legal and equitable claims. Some may 
argue that the contract’s nonexistence is entitled to adjudication in a pre-
selected forum, but this takes the argument too far. It is one thing to have a 
clause bolstering a contract’s performance but quite another to use a clause 
reinforcing its failure from the outset.   
The contract’s only substantive function was Weber’s remuneration.413 
With that invalidated, nothing remained except the contract for procedure to 
litigate something that was per se invalid in that forum, at least according to 
 
 408 Id. at 765-766. 
 409 Id. at 776. 
 410 Id. at 775. 
 411 Id. at 763, 765. 
 412 Lewis Carrol, Alice’s Adventures in Wonderland, 89 (1869). 
 413 See Id. See also the Magistrate Judge’s opinion in Weber v. PACT XPP Techs., A.G., No. 
2:13-CV-0995-JRG-RSP, 2015 WL 13297959 at *1 (E.D. Tex. Feb. 25, 2015). 
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the contract’s drafter.414 The severability function in an invalid contract left 
a forum clause mandating a foreign forum for a contract that didn’t exist.  
The severability doctrine has its place in forum clause discussions, as the 
United States Supreme Court explained Buckeye Check Cashing, Inc. v. 
Cardegna.415  The idea is that the forum-derogating plaintiff may not defeat 
a forum clause by alleging the contract’s illegality, and specifically by 
alleging fraud in the inducement.416 That concept does not apply in Weber 
where, ironically, it was the non-derogating party PACT who alleged the 
contract’s invalidity but wanted its grinning Cheshire cat forum clause to 
survive.￼417 
4.  Governing Law—Questions Begged and Conclusions 
Assumed 
Choice of law is a difficult and disputed issue in adjudicating forum 
clauses.418 There are two choice-of-law questions: what law governs validity 
(defined as “interpretation” in Weber),419 and what law governs 
enforceability. Atlantic Marine reaffirmed the answer to the second question 
(federal law controls enforcement) but left open the validity question.420 That 
issue—the law governing validity—was ripe in Weber, although it went 
unaddressed in the district court which may show how fast the case went 
through.421 On appeal, the court used an elastic choice-of-law analysis that it 
shaped to fit the strong Atlantic Marine presumption.422 That analysis invites 
scrutiny if not rejection on three points. 
 
 414 Weber, 811 F.3d at 769. 
 415 Buckeye Check Cashing, Inc. v. Cardegna, 546 U.S. 440 (2006), further applying the 
precedents in Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 399, 403–04 (1967), and 
Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1 (1984). 
 416 See Yackee, supra note 73 at 59–60. 
 417 Weber, 811 F.3d at 763. 
 418 See supra at Part II.C, C.  Post-Bremen Analytics. 
 419 See Weber, 811 F.3d at 769 (“we apply Texas choice of law rules to determine which 
substantive law governs the interpretation of the FSC”). 
 420 Atl. Marine Constr. Co. v. United States Dist. Court, 571 U.S. 49, 134 S. Ct. 568, 63 (2013) 
 421 Weber, 811 F.3d at 764. 
 422 Id. at 767. 
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a.  Chickens and eggs  
The court used German law prematurely to construe the contract. 423That 
is, it used German law, not just German language, to construe sitz before 
entering the choice of law step.  Instead of prematurely applying German law, 
the court should have applied German language at large to the term sitz which 
would have focused the court more on its ambiguity. To be clear, it is not 
wrong to use foreign law to translate a foreign-language document, especially 
as to substantive legal terms. But it stretches the process to apply foreign law 
to a dispute-resolution term that is already vague and only comes to light as 
a legal term when considered under that foreign law, while ignoring a party’s 
understanding based on other meanings under that foreign language, all prior 
to the choice-of-law analysis. The court did not analyze drafting ambiguity 
so it’s difficult to say if that would have come out, but it would have resolved 
the ambiguity issue in a proper light.424 If it came out in Weber’s favor, then 
the clause might have called for PACT’s original corporate location which 
was California.  It could also be interpreted as a floating forum clause which 
would recognize the relocation to Munich, but even then it would give 
credence to Weber’s misunderstanding. 
This is the chicken-and-egg problem in forum clause analysis. The 
foremost example occurs in disputes where the parties’ contract had both a 
choice-of-law clause and a forum clause.  If the choice of law clause is 
considered first and found applicable, it will likely validate the issues that 
follow since parties seldom choose a governing law that invalidates their 
objectives.425 As Professor Mullenix points out, the chicken-egg problem is 
not limited to cases involving choice-of-law clauses, but instead implicates 
“a confounding host of chicken-and-egg-like issues relating to a threshold 
determination of the validity and enforceability of forum-selection-
clauses.”426  
 
 423 Id. at 770. 
 424 Id. at 769. 
 425 See e.g.. Beilfus v. Huffy Corp., 685 N.W.2d 373, 376 (Wis. Ct. App. 2004), discussed at 
Governing Law, supra note 155 at 644. 
 426 See Gaming the System, supra note 176 at 731. See also Another Choice of Forum, supra 
note 153 at 347–350. 
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Discussing the same analytical problem, Professor Sachs notes that forum 
law governs initial matters in forum-clause analytics.427 Although it is true 
that German law would uphold this clause, that conclusion is appropriate only 
after German law has been selected. In Weber, before any choice of law 
analysis was attempted (and before the Erie path was chosen), the court 
treated sitz as a German term of art, applied German law, and thus assumed 
a conclusion affecting interpretation and validity. That is, the Weber court 
endorsed the PACT contract’s implicit choice of German law when the 
contract never mentioned any consideration of what law would govern.428 
b.  Erie and the Texas choice of law rules 
At some point choice of law analysis is necessary in analyzing forum 
clauses. Consistent with many circuits, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals 
used federal common law prior to Weber, apparently under the view that the 
question is one of venue requiring contract analysis.429 A number of courts 
and scholars argue for an Erie approach—that state law should control 
forum-clause validity, at least in diversity cases, because of the underlying 
issues of substantive contract law.430 Using Erie for the validity phase 
underscores the contract autonomy view and enhances Atlantic Marine’s 
already-heightened presumption for forum clause adherence. That’s not to 
say that the Erie/state law approach is necessarily wrong for this federal 
venue question, but it is to say that we should realize its function in 
steepening an already harsh presumption. 
In Weber, the Fifth Circuit adopted the Erie approach to use forum state 
law in assessing contracts governing federal venue. 431 In Texas the relevant 
law is the most significant relationship test from the Restatement (Second) 
 
 427 See generally Forum Selection Defense, supra note 150. 
 428 See Weber, 811 F.3d at 771. 
 429 Id. at 770. 
 430 See Steinman, supra note 154; Gaming the System, supra note 176 at 732–34; Five 
Questions, supra note 153 at 766–68; Forum Selection Defense, supra note 150 at 14–24; Yackee, 
supra note 73 at 64–67; Another Choice of Forum, supra note 153 at 332–39; Perils of Contract 
Procedure, supra note 78 at 1023–25; Governing Law, supra note 155 at 664–68. The Supreme 
Court considered the Erie approach in Stewart Org., Inc. v. Ricoh Corp., 487 U.S. 22 (1988), but 
only as to the law governing enforcement. 
 431 See Weber, 811 F.3d at 770. 
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Conflict of Laws—except when there’s a superseding statute, which there is 
for internal corporate affairs.432 As noted above, the Weber court’s omission 
is harmless because the statute likely reaches the same result applying 
German law,433 but the oversight is another example of the haste with which 
forum clauses are approved. Properly applied, the internal affairs statute 
should invoke German law but only to Weber’s contract claims as a board 
member.434 His quantum meruit claim probably fell outside the statute’s 
scope, although that is difficult to tell with no court analysis.435 
The court in Weber overlooked the internal affairs doctrine and went 
straight to the Restatement’s multi-factor balancing tests, and that’s where 
the bigger mistake occurred.436 The Texas Supreme Court adopted the most 
significant relationship test in 1984 for all choice of law issues not governed 
by statute.437 In that adoption, the Texas Supreme Court expressly invoked 
dépeçage, the principle that choice of law is done on an issue-by-issue 
basis.438 The fact that German law governs Weber’s contract claim does not 
mean it governs his other claims. Had the court followed Texas law, it would 
have considered separately what law governed Weber’s non-contractual 
claim for quantum meruit.439 A likely solution is that German law would 
 
 432 See Tex. Bus. Org. Code §§ 1.102–.103, 1.105, quoted in U. S. Bank Nat’l Assoc. v. Verizon 
Commc’ns, Inc., 892 F. Supp. 2d 805, 828 (N.D. Tex. 2012). See also Restatement (Second) 
Conflict of Laws § 302 (Am. Law Inst. 1971). 
 433 See discussion supra III.B.4.a. 
 434 It is not a given that the corporate affairs doctrine applies. Its application to rights and 
liabilities does not necessarily render it applicable to procedural issues like forum contests. But to 
the extent this forum contest has to be answered with a contract question, the doctrine would seem 
to apply. See TEX. BUS. ORG. CODE §§ 1.102–.103, 1.105 (West 2009); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) 
CONFLICT OF LAWS § 302 (AM. LAW INST. 1971) 
   435 Weber, 811 F.3d at 765. 
   436 Restatement (Second) Conflict of Laws § 188. 
 437 See Duncan v. Cessna Aircraft Co., 665 S.W.2d 414 (Tex. 1984). 
 438 “[I]n all choice of law cases, except those contract cases in which the parties have agreed to 
a valid choice of law clause, the law of the state with the most significant relationship to the 
particular substantive issue will be applied to resolve that issue.” Id. at 421 (emphasis added). See 
also Restatement (Second) Conflict of Laws § 188 (1) & (2) and cmt. d; Willis Reese, Dépeçage: 
A Common Phenomenon in Choice of Law, 73 COLUM. L. REV. 58 (1973). 
 439 For an example of dépeçage, see In re Park Central Global Litig., No. 3:09-CV-0765-M, 
2010 WL 3119403 (N.D. Tex. Aug. 5, 2010) (following the internal affairs doctrine to apply 
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govern claims under the Remuneration Agreement and Texas law would 
govern the equity claims for Weber’s work done in Texas, the same work that 
generated the profit at issue in the case. The issue-splitting analysis is so 
fundamental to the primary Texas choice-of-law rule that the court should 
have applied it even if Weber didn’t argue it.440 
Of course, if the forum clause was to be enforced, then the court was 
never going to reach the case’s merits. But that’s the point: the forum clause 
was in the Remuneration Agreement with a scope limited to payment for 
Weber’s service on the board in Munich. Weber’s claims for his work in 
Texas fell outside the Remuneration Agreement but were not considered on 
their own. That’s the purpose of dépeçage and the court did not address it, 
instead finding comfort in the Atlantic Marine presumption and the rush to 
enforce the forum clause. 
c.  Texas public policy 
The forum state’s public policy is a primary factor in choice of law 
analysis. This is reflected throughout the Restatement, including its places as 
the second factor in the most significant relationship test.441 The Weber 
appellate opinion did not weigh Texas policy even though the dispute 
concerned, at least in part, Weber’s rightful share of the patent infringement 
damages from a federal case in Texas.442 To the extent the court was focused 
on the contract claim limited to Weber’s service on the PACT board, the lack 
of Texas interests is accurate. If the focus shifts to Weber’s work done in 
 
Delaware law to Delaware entities and Texas law to other parties). On the point of forum law 
governing remedies, see Restatement (Second) Conflict of Laws § 131 cmt. a (1971), discussed in 
regard to forum clauses at Forum Selection Defense, supra note 150 at 14 n. 77 and accompanying 
text. See also Restatement (Second) Conflict of Laws § 124. (“The local law of the forum determines 
the form in which a proceeding may be instituted on a claim involving foreign elements.”). 
 440 Once a party invokes a basic law, for example the forum state’s choice-of-law rule, the court 
should apply that basic law accurately. To the extent it was not done correctly in the trial court, 
appellate courts have the power of plain-error review. See Contracting for Procedure, supra note 
176 at 563 & n. 213, citing HARRY T. EDWARDS AND LINDA A. ELLIOTT, FEDERAL COURTS 
STANDARDS OF REVIEW: APPELLATE COURT REVIEW OF DISTRICT COURT DECISIONS AND 
AGENCY ACTIONS, 55–56 (2007). 
 441 See Restatement (Second) Conflict of Laws § 6(2)(b). 
   442 Weber, 811 F.3d at 763. 
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Texas for at least five years, the court’s analysis is wrong. Ironically, the 
court quoted the DeSantis case for the point that a service contract’s 
designation of place of service is ordinarily determinative of governing 
law.443 
The DeSantis holding is instructive. The case involved a non-compete 
agreement between a Florida-based security company and its Houston-based 
regional manager, DeSantis, who’d broken away to start his own company.444 
DeSantis’s prior employment contract had a non-compete agreement which 
was valid in Florida, and the contract specified Florida law as governing.445 
The Texas Supreme Court rejected the Florida choice-of-law clause as 
violating Texas public policy because it affected DeSantis’s Texas 
employment.446 DeSantis supports Weber’s conclusion if we limit our focus 
to Weber’s claim on PACT’s narrowly-drafted contract for board meeting in 
Munich. When we consider Weber’s equity claim for work done in Texas, 
DeSantis lends the opposite support for the point that Texas has a strong 
interest in Texas-based employment.447 Neither that policy nor the fact of 
Weber’s Texas efforts were factors in the court’s decision.448 
A full analysis of Texas policy requires looking at a later case 
commenting on DeSantis. In re Autonation Inc.449 was a non-compete dispute 
involving lawsuits in Florida and Texas. Florida-based Autonation sued first 
in Florida to enforce a non-compete agreement against Hatfield, its former 
Texas-based manager. Hatfield counter-sued in Texas seeking a declaration 
of the non-compete’s unenforceability here, based on DeSantis. The lower 
courts agreed with Hatfield but the Texas Supreme Court reversed, based on 
the Florida case being the first-filed, and on its filing there being consistent 
with the parties’ express choice of Florida as an exclusive forum. In so ruling, 
the Texas Supreme Court was careful to note the ongoing interest in Texas 
law applying to Texas litigation concerning work in Texas.450  
 
 443 See Id. at 772, quoting DeSantis v. Wackenhut Corp., 793 S.W.2d 670, 679 (Tex. 1990). 
   444 Id. at 675. 
   445 Id. 
   446 Id. at 680. 
   447 Id. at 776. 
   448 Id. 
 449 In re Autonation, Inc., 228 S.W.3d 663, 664 (Tex. 2007). 
 450 Id. at 669. 
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If read on the simplest basis, Autonation seems to support PACT’s 
argument that Texas law favors mandatory forum clauses related to Texas 
employment. That conclusion ignores crucial distinctions related to the 
concerns discussed in this article. In the Autonation contact, the forum clause 
was express, Autonation did business both in the Florida forum and 
throughout the United States (making centralized litigation efficient), and 
Autonation filed first consistent with that express clause. In contrast, the 
PACT enterprise was limited to patent exploitation in the United States with 
the German activities being nothing more than board meetings, rendering 
irrelevant the efficiency of centralized litigation since Weber was the only 
active employee. Weber’s contract failed to name a forum, was expressly 
limited to Weber’s board service, and was entirely invalid as to substance 
leaving only the vague forum clause.  Weber sued first, raising claims both 
on the contract and the Texas work. None of the factors cited in Autonation’s 
distinguishing its holding from DeSantis apply. All this is not to say that 
Texas policy interests exceeded Germany’s interests, certainly not on the 
narrowly-drawn contract, but it is to say that Texas had an interest in Weber’s 
non-contract claims for work done in Texas. Those Texas interests did not 
register in the analysis.   
5.  Scope 
The PACT contract was limited to Weber’s services to the PACT board, 
specifying Munich as the performance in question. Like the PACT contract 
generally, this focus on Munich can be deemed vague and ambiguous 
because of Weber’s significant work for PACT in the United States. As far 
as we know, the only thing that happened in Munich was the board meetings, 
and that was the contract’s clear focus. The forum clause makes no mention 
of claims arising outside the contract, and if its scope is limited to the 
contracted-for service,451 then Weber’s work in Texas falls outside the 
contract and the forum clause does not apply. The court, however, did not 
address the forum clause’s scope and instead gave the clause the most 
expansive reading possible, covering Weber’s quantum meruit claim 
expressly directed to the work in Texas which earned $15 million.452  
 
 451 See e.g. Phillips v. Audio Active, Ltd., 494 F.3d 378, 392 (2d Cir. 2007) (quantum meruit 
claims related both to contract and copyright did not arise under the contract). 
 452 See Complaint, para. 56. 
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6. Enforcement—The Gulf Oil Balancing Factors 
Having decided that German law governed and the clause was mandatory, 
the court moved to the clause enforcement stage.  Because the dispute 
involves a United States federal forum and a foreign country, the analysis is 
governed by federal common law and the forum non conveniens balancing 
factors under Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert.453 Under Atlantic Marine’s revised 
formula, this calls for a thumb-on-the-scale analysis of the public factors and 
no analysis of the private factors.454 The court’s public-factor analysis was 
accurate and fair as to Weber’s contract claim which was expressly limited 
to his service on the board in Munich.455  It was silent on his equity claim for 
his Texas work.456 As pointed out in the choice-of-law critique, the public 
factors analysis should have included the Texas policy interest for five years 
of work in Texas.457 
In addition to the court’s disregard of Weber’s entitlement to payment for 
obtaining the Texas judgment, the Weber case is instructive of the need for 
private factor analysis at the enforcement stage. The best illustration of that 
role is summarized in the magistrate judge’s recitation of why PACT was 
amenable to Texas jurisdiction: 
PACT selected this forum and spent several years 
prosecuting its lawsuit here, going all the way through a jury 
trial, which was attended by officers of PACT. There is no 
dispute that the contract at issue in the current suit addressed 
the conduct of the Plaintiff, as an officer of PACT, in 
attending that trial here in Texas. Furthermore, the proceeds 
of the judgment arising from that trial are the object of the 
recovery sought by Plaintiff from Defendant in this case.458 
 
 453 Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501, 508–09 (1947). 
 454 Atl. Marine Constr. Co. v. U.S. Dist. Court for W. Dist. of Tex., 571 U.S. 49, 63 (2013). 
 455 See Weber v. PACT XPP Techs., A.G., 811 F.3d 758, 773 (5th Cir. 2016). 
 456 See id. 
 457 See supra notes 368–372 and accompanying text. 
 458 Weber v. PACT XPP Techs., A.G., No. 2:13-CV-0995-JRG-RSP, 2015 WL 13297959, at 
*1 (E.D. Tex. Feb. 25, 2015). 
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Had the private factors been used in regard to the Texas-based equity claim, 
the only German factor was the situs of one of the contracting parties.459  All 
other contacts point to Texas or California.460 The private factors raise 
important points about the nature of this dispute, the limited nature of the 
parties’ contract, and the separate viability of Weber’s equity claim. The 
magistrate judge considered those facts only for PACT’s jurisdictional 
objection, and the court of appeals did not consider them at all.461 
It can be argued that the jurisdictional issue is distinct from forum-clause 
enforcement, and it is, but the underlying facts do not disappear. This was a 
Texas-centered dispute in which plaintiff sought payment for work done in 
Texas, and that claim was upended by the weakest of forum clauses whose 
scope was limited to a narrowly-drafted contract that did not address the 
Texas contacts. The inclusion of private-factor analysis could have shifted 
the focus back to that Texas-based claim. 
This is not to say that private factors should have the same weight as they 
do in a routine forum-non-conveniens analysis, either under 28 U.S.C. § 1404 
or Gulf Oil. The Supreme Court is correct that the parties’ forum clause 
agreement anticipated those elements and agreed about private convenience. 
But those pre-dispute anticipations are subject to changed circumstances, and 
venue agreements are best viewed in light of the facts at the dispute’s outset. 
The burden should remain on the clause-derogating party, but the factors 
should remain in play. 
IV.  CONCLUSION 
Perhaps Peter Weber deserved to lose.  He’s was an experienced 
businessman who made a number of mistakes.  Like many sophisticated 
contracting parties, he may have brushed past the forum clause and given it 
no thought, not anticipating litigation at that moment.  Instead he should have 
had a German attorney advise him.  Or he may have given it thought and 
assumed that the corporate sitz was California, based on PACT’s stated 
purpose of enforcing its United States patent in United States courts, PACT’s 
initial headquarters in California, and his role at the chief executive officer. 
 
 459 See id. 
 460 See id. 
 461 See id. 
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PACT may have been justified in terminating Weber. The contract 
contemplated company earnings far exceeding the single $15 million 
judgment Weber obtained.462 Weber may have underperformed, and there 
may be other good reasons for his termination.  
Then again, Weber may be the victim of Bremen’s overweighted 
presumption and its capacity for summary enforcement and cursory rejection 
of inconsistent views.463 Weber sued in a Texas federal court for 
compensation for years of work that earned PACT $15 million.464 He was 
fired with no pay.465 The court dismissed the case in compliance with a forum 
clause that failed to name a jurisdiction, was part of a contract whose entire 
substance was invalid and was applied to claims unrelated to the contract.466 
In spite of those ambiguities and contractual failures, the court enforced the 
clause as though it read: 
The parties agree that their relationship, if any, shall be 
governed by German law and litigated in a German court.  
The parties further agree that in the event the relationship 
described herein does not exist or is otherwise invalid, 
Weber’s other rights to remuneration from PACT shall be 
limited to those provided by German law, to be determined 
exclusively in a German court.467 
Whatever the proper outcome here, the Weber decision is a based on 
troubling concepts that underscore concerns about the Bremen presumption, 
especially in its Atlantic Marine incarnation. It encourages cursory review 
that minimizes or ignores inconsistent factors.  It encourages courts to find a 
 
 462 See Complaint, para. 56. 
 463 As Professor Sachs notes, “Atlantic Marine places enormous weight on whether a forum 
selection clause is valid and enforceable. If it is, enforcement is virtually automatic; ‘[o]nly under 
extraordinary circumstances’ will a plaintiff be allowed to litigate somewhere other than the chosen 
forum. Yet the opinion says nothing about which clauses are valid in the first place.” Five Questions, 
supra note 153 at 766, quoting Atl. Marine Constr. Co. v. U.S. District Court, 571 U.S. 49, 62 
(2013). 
 464 Weber v. PACT XPP Techs., A.G., 811 F.3d 758, 773 (5th Cir. 2016). 
 465 Id. 
 466 Id. at 776. 
 467 Id. 
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way to enforce the clause. It is not a presumption regarding burdens of proof 
but a predisposition that alters judicial assessment.  
In the Weber case, there is no particular concept that should be barred. 
Forum clauses that fail to name a forum can be appropriate, for example when 
limiting litigation to multiple sites where the claims might arise. On forum 
clause severability, parties should be able to have an appropriately-worded 
dispute resolution contract that stands alone, although that does not justify 
the severability application that occurred here. The chicken-and-egg choice 
of law function is troubling but perhaps unavoidable in some instances of 
legal analysis.468 To the extent contract autonomy should preempt the 
forum’s jurisdiction and venue rules, the Erie approach is logical though not 
the only choice. The most difficult concession is Atlantic Marine’s exclusion 
of the private interest factors in the clause enforcement phase. While it is 
tenable in the abstract to say that the parties already contracted on that issue, 
the reality is that the private factors not only measure fairness, but also 
illuminate essential contractual issues such as party intent and changed 
circumstances.  
Because forum clauses should be assessed on a case-by-case basis like 
personal jurisdiction, it is difficult to design standard rules.  Within that 
limitation, several points come to mind. In considering forum clauses, the 
derogating court should:  
• presume against clauses that do not name a forum; 
• presume against ambiguous clauses;  
• apply the concept of contract severability sparingly 
rather than liberally presume in Weber;  
• consider the forum clause’s scope—to what actions does 
it apply—and construe it narrowly if the current lawsuit 
arises in the derogating forum; 
• restore the Gulf Oil private factors test but keep the 
presumption against the derogating plaintiff’s choice of 
forum.  
 
 468 The chicken-egg presumption brings to mind the illogical-but-necessary leap taken in Ex 
Parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908) (holding that suing state officers acting within the scope of their 
authority was not a lawsuit against the state). 
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Choice of law issues are more difficult and the solution depends on the 
derogating forum’s approach to forum clauses—are they venue issues or 
contract issues? If venue, then forum law will control most if not all aspects 
but perhaps at the expense of otherwise valid contractual obligations. If 
contract, then the problem lies with avoiding the chicken-and-egg problem 
of whether to applying the contract’s governing law (designated or not) to 
validate the clause. In any event, the derogating court should not apply a 
foreign law to validate a clause without first confirming that law’s 
applicability through the forum’s choice of law rule. 
The Weber opinion is an example of all these issues, but is merely the 
product of bad law and not the originator. Five judges agreed, and were 
within the legal and discretionary bounds of Atlantic Marine’s mandate. The 
decision was driven by Atlantic Marine’s extreme presumption that functions 
more as a predisposition to enforce forum clauses. The presumption is too 
strong, if not in outright wording then at least in application. Lawsuits to 
enforce substantive contracts do not typically pose preconceived outcomes, 
even if the prima facie contract is presumed valid. Neither should forum 
clause analysis.  
 
